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Abstract
The Internet has signiﬁcantly reshaped the way people communicate with each other
in recent years. People are sending messages, such as emails, playing games and shar-
ing news, ideas and entertainment with their friends on the Internet. Meanwhile, this
platform has also been utilized to commit cybercrime, such as distributing computer
viruses, malicious URLs, spam, rumors and gossip. Recent research has found that
malicious information can spread incredibly fast on the Internet and its derivative
applications, such as online social networks (Facebook and Twitter). This problem
has become so critical that it has caused signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss and social damage.
In order to counter this threat, previous research proposed propagation models of
Internet malicious information and then, on the basis of the information, investigated
the optimal strategies of restraining the speed and scale they spread. Propagation
models need to be accurate and the proposed defense strategies can then be convin-
cible. However, according to recent research this requirement cannot be satisﬁed by
previous models. In addition, researchers have introduced many defense strategies in
order to restrain the spread of malicious information. Every strategy claims superi-
ority to the others. However, there must be one standing out. So far, we have not
found any work that convincingly answers the question about which or what defense
strategy is optimal to restrain the spread of malicious information.
In this dissertation, we attempt to address the above problems. Our work mainly
consists of two parts. First, we propose a series of mathematical models to present
the propagation dynamics of malicious information from the Internet. Our model-
s are distinct from previous models since they solve four critical problems in this
xx
ﬁeld: 1) temporal propagation dynamics; 2) spatial dependence; 3) reinfection and
self-start reinfection and 4) propagation dynamics of conﬂicting information. Ex-
periments based on real networks show that our proposed models are much more
accurate compared with previous models. Second, we collect defense strategies from
both academic ﬁelds and the real world, and explore the optimal defense strategy by
using our models as the evaluation platform. We carry out both an empirical and
theoretical analysis on those strategies. The results show: 1) the most popular users
in networks may not be the most inﬂuential nodes in the topologies of networks; 2)
blocking malicious information from most inﬂuential users only restrains the speed
and scale of their spread but cannot stop their propagation and eliminate the ‘in-
fected’ incidents in networks; 3) when there are two types of conﬂicting information
spreading in networks, distributing the true information cannot restrain the speed
and scale of the spread but can greatly decrease the amount of ‘infected’ users in the
long run.
From both the academic and practical perspective, our work is of great signiﬁcance
in this ﬁeld. However, there is still some ongoing work following the results from this
thesis.
Keywords: Modeling, Propagation, Malicious information, Internet, Defense
xxi
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background of Malicious Information
The popularity of the Internet and its applications, such as email, Facebook and
Twitter, has signiﬁcantly increased in recent years. The Internet has become an
important platform for people sharing news, ideas and opinions, etc. Unfortunately,
Internet is a double-edged sword. Its openness also enables malicious information,
such as computer viruses, rumors and other forms of misinformation to spread all
around the world. Recent research has shown that malicious information can spread
incredibly fast in the Internet and its applications [31].
A computer virus is one of the major forms of malicious information spreading
in the Internet. According to their propagation mechanisms, researchers generally
categorize computer viruses into scanning-based viruses and topological-based viruses
[93]. For scanning-based viruses, Internet users’ computers are infected when they
have vulnerabilities in their operation systems or installed software. Once a computer
is infected, it will send out speciﬁc packages to randomly generated targets looking
for new victims who have the same vulnerabilities. Once a susceptible computer has
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been detected, a virus copy will be transferred to this newly detected victim. The
eﬃciency of scanning-based viruses depends on the scanning function of new victims.
It has been proven that the preferential scanning mechanism currently has the best
eﬃciency in spreading a virus [86]. The virus using preferential scanning mechanism
always considers computers residing in neighboring IP addresses are more likely to
be potential victims. A typical instance of this type of virus is Code Red, which
successfully infected millions of computers in the Internet [110].
Topological-based viruses become a critical threat to the Internet because online
social networks are attracting more and more users in recent years. Once an Internet
user is infected by a topological virus, the computer of this user will send malicious
email copies to friends embedded in email lists or post infectious hyperlinks on the wall
of online social network platforms. When users receive and read the malicious email
copies or visit the malicious webpage conducted by the hyperlink, their computers will
be infected. The infection processes are repeated from one user to their topologically
neighboring users, and then spreads quickly, reaching a large scale. Typical instances
of topological-based viruses include the ‘Love Letter’ email worm [2] and ‘KoobFace’
that spread in Facebook [38].
Compared with scanning-based computer viruses, topological-based viruses rely
on the information contained in a victim’s machine to locate new targets. This intel-
ligent mechanism allows far more eﬃcient propagation than scanning-based viruses
that make a large number of wild guesses for every successful infection [94]. Thus,
topological-based viruses can infect other victims on most attempts. Secondly, by
using social engineering techniques that exploit trust in social networks, many users
fail to recognize malicious codes sent by their friends and subsequently the individual
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becomes infected. This results in a wide range of users that worms can propagate to.
Thirdly, researchers have found that social networks exhibit both small world prop-
erties and scale-free behaviors [32, 62]. This means the spreading of social network
worms can be incredibly fast because the highly connected “hub” nodes of a scale-free
network and the short paths in a strongly clustered small world will greatly facilitate
the propagation of an infection over the whole network.
Another type of malicious information spreading in the Internet are rumors and
gossips. Similar to topological-based computer viruses, rumors and gossips are gen-
erally propagated by posting them on the wall of online social network platforms.
In the real world, there are many instances of rumors and gossips spreading in the
Internet. For example, we witnessed Twitter play a crucial role in the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings and London riots [31].
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on the propagation of topological-based viruses
and rumors. For the propagation of scanning-based computer viruses, readers may
refer to the survey papers [93, 101,111] and Dr. Y. Wang’s dissertation [89].
1.2 Motivation and Research Issues
The object of our work is to ﬁght against malicious information in the Internet. The
ﬁrst step is to model the propagation dynamics of Internet malicious information.
Similar to the research on some natural disasters, like earthquake or tsunami, model-
ing can help us understand and characterize the key properties of their spreading. In
this ﬁeld, it is mandatory to guarantee the accuracy of modeling before the derived
countermeasures are convincible.
Currently, researchers have proposed several models to present the propagation of
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malicious information. For example, early works mainly refer to academic thought on
epidemic propagation, including the Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS) model
[75], and Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) models [10, 64, 65]. Later, the work
of [24] presents a spatial-temporal model and the works of [36, 42, 103, 112] propose
simulation models. The work of [25] develops an SI model on an interconnected
social network of smart phones. Moreover, the independent cascade model (ICM)
[9,13,20,21,26,49,52,82] and the linear threshold model (LTM) [11,26,46,49] are two
primary models for the propagation of both rumor and truth in online social networks.
However, according to our investigation, none of these models can accurately present
the propagation of Internet malicious information. We list the research issues as
follows:
• The problem of temporal dynamics : The spread of malicious information de-
pends on human involvement. That is users periodically check their newly
arrived emails or messages, and are lured to open those which are actually ma-
licious copies. The period for checking these emails or messages depends on a
user’s own patterns. However, temporal dynamics, which model the spread of
malicious information with diﬀerent checking periods of users, have not been
implemented in previous work. Most previous models, such as [24,83], assume a
user starts infecting others the moment the user becomes infected, which mean-
s the checking periods are identical and assumed to be one. Thus, previous
models cannot present an accurate and realistic spreading procedure.
• The problem of spatial dependence: The spreading of malicious information
relies on network topologies. A node in the topology corresponds to a user in
the network. In modeling, the probability of a node being infected will increase
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when its neighbors have been infected. However, the increasing part in the
probability cannot reversely increase the probabilities of its neighbors being
infected. Otherwise, the modeling has redundant computation. This is the
problem of spatial dependence. Previous works, such as [18, 24], simplify this
problem and assume nodes to be spatially independent. Our empirical study
shows their works signiﬁcantly overestimate the number of infected users.
• The problem of modeling reinfection processes : This problem mainly concern-
s the spread of email malware (a kind of email virus). The previous work-
s [24, 42, 112] assume each infected user sends out malicious email copies only
once, after which the user will not send out further malware copies, even if
this user visits a malicious hyperlink or attachment again. However, modern
email malware is far more aggressive in spreading within networks than ear-
ly versions. An infected user will send out malware copies whenever this user
visits those malicious hyperlinks or attachments, or when certain events (like
PC restart) are triggered. According to our investigation, previous work fails
to model the reinfection processes [24,42,112] and have greatly underestimated
the propagation of modern email malware.
• The problem of modeling the propagation of conﬂicting information: In the
real world, rumors and truths can compromise each other and both are spread
in the Internet. In this case, previous works concerned with modeling single-
type information [25, 34, 41, 51, 86, 86, 104, 105] are incapable of capturing the
phenomena happening in the presence of contradictory information. This is
because the model needs to present the process of people making choices if they
receive both kinds of information. Currently, the independent cascade model
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(ICM) and the linear threshold model (LTM) are two primary models for the
propagation of conﬂicting information. However, people in the ICM and the
LTM are limited to two basic states of believing either rumor or truth. This is
far from being enough to represent the diﬀerences in social behavior of people.
Secondly, there are mainly two types of methods in order to restrain the spread
of Internet malicious information. These are: 1) blocking malicious information at
the most inﬂuential users or community bridges, or 2) spreading patches or truths to
eliminate malicious information. Restraining the spread of malicious information has
long been important but diﬃcult to address. We summarize the research issues as
follows:
• The problem of locating the most inﬂuential users : It is almost impossible for us
to monitor all users in the Internet. So far, a feasible way is to immunize a group
of Internet users to prevent malicious information from propagating to a large
scale. Thus, the ﬁrst problem in this part of the research is how to choose the
appropriate size and membership of this group of users. For example, a common
view for a preferable position of defence is for the most popular Internet users to
be immunized. However, counter-intuitively, my recent research suggests that
this viewpoint may not be correct. This part of my thesis can help network
designers optimize the structure of the Internet.
• The problem of identifying an optimal defense strategy : Every kind of counter-
measures has pros and cons. Each method claims better performance among all
the others according to their own considerations and environments. However,
there must be one standing out from the rest. Because there does not exist a
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universal standard to evaluate all defense strategies together, the question of
which method is the best has long been important but diﬃcult to answer.
The objective of this thesis is to address the above problems.
1.3 Overview of the Work and its Contribution
Firstly, to address the problems of temporal dynamics and spatial dependence, we
propose ‘social network worms’, a novel analytical model for typical malicious infor-
mation. This model implements a spatial-temporal synchronization process, which
is able to capture temporal dynamics. In addition, we ﬁnd the essence of spatial
dependence is spreading cycles. By eliminating the eﬀect of these cycles, our model
overcomes the computational challenge of spatial dependence and provides a stronger
approximation to the propagation dynamics. To evaluate our susceptible-infectious-
immunized (SII) model, we conduct a theoretical analysis and extensive simulations.
Compared with previous epidemic models and the spatial-temporal model, experi-
mental results show our SII model achieves greater accuracy. We also compare our
model with the SIS and SIR models. The results show our model is more suitable for
modeling the propagation of malicious information.
Secondly , to address the problem of modeling reinfection processes of modern
email malware, we derive a novel diﬀerence equation based analytical model by in-
troducing a new concept of a virtual infected user. The proposed model can precisely
present the repetitious spreading process caused by reinfection and self-start and
eﬀectively overcome the associated computational challenges. We perform a compre-
hensive empirical and theoretical study to validate the proposed analytical model.
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The results show our model outperforms previous models in terms of both estimation
accuracy and computational cost.
Thirdly , we also address the problem of modeling the propagation of conﬂicting
information. If we use rumor and truth as an example, we model the temporal
dynamics of the spread, such as the time people check newly arrived messages or
when they forward them. The extensive simulations conducted on the real topologies
adopted from Facebook and Google Plus conﬁrm the high accuracy of our model
estimations. We further study the impact of social parameters on propagation using
our analytical model. We found that some factors, such as people’s preference and the
injection time of the opposing information, are critical to propagation, but for others,
such as the hearsay forwarding intention, they have little impact on propagation.
Finally , we extend the work on modeling the propagation of rumors and truths,
and address the problem of identifying most inﬂuential users and optimal defense
strategies. We carry out a series of empirical and theoretical analysis on the basis
of the introduced mathematical model. Based on this mathematical platform, each
method will be evaluated in real online social networks (OSNs). We have performed
three kinds of analysis in this thesis. First, we compare all measures of locating im-
portant users. The results suggest the degree and betweenness measures outperform
all others in the Facebook network. Second, we analyze the method of the truth
clariﬁcation method, and ﬁnd it has long-term performance while the degree measure
only performs well in the early stage. Third, in order to leverage these two methods,
we further explore the strategy of diﬀerent methods working together and the equiva-
lence of these measures. Given a ﬁxed budget in the real world, our analysis provides
a potential solution to ﬁnd a better strategy by integrating both kinds of methods.
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From both an academic and technical perspective, the work in this thesis is a small,
but important step towards the most practical and optimal strategies for restraining
rumors in OSNs.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This section presents the overall organization of this thesis. As the objective of this
thesis is to address critical problems in propagation modeling and propose an accurate
model for Internet malicious information, the content of each chapter is organized as
follows:
• Chapter 2 : This chapter presents a comprehensive survey on propagation
modeling and defense methods, including relevant concepts, assumptions, and
emerging research issues in this area. Eﬀorts have been given to identifying
varying research directions, current issues and any new and important research
issues.
• Chapter 3 : We propose a model to present the propagation of social net-
work worms. This model can model the temporal dynamics of the propagation
of social network worms. Moreover, this model is quite accurate since it can
approximate the eﬀect of propagation cycles.
• Chapter 4 : We also model the propagation of modern email malware. Because
modern email malware spreads in a reinfection and self-starting way, it can
propagate much faster than traditional email malware. In order to address
the diﬃculty in modeling the reinfection processes, we introduce virtual nodes
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that can present the extra propagation eﬀect from reinfection processes. The
experiments show our proposed model is quite accurate.
• Chapter 5 : We also model the propagation of conﬂicting information in online
social networks. If we take rumors and truths as an example, the proposed
model can present the processes of human involvements. On the basis of the
proposed model, we further investigate the impact of each parameter in the
propagation, which is of great signiﬁcance for both academic and the practical
purposes.
• Chapter 6 : Currently, researchers have proposed some eﬀective and eﬃcient
countermeasures for the defense of Internet malicious information. Based on
the proposed models, we carry out a series of experiments and analysis in order
to ﬁnd out which countermeasure can stand out.
• Chapter 7 : This chapter summarizes the research in this thesis, and presents
some possible suggestions and extensions for future research.
To maintain readability, each chapter is organized in a self-contained format, and
some essential contents, e.g. deﬁnition or motivation, are brieﬂy recounted in related
chapters.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Propagation Models of Malicious Information
2.1.1 The Taxonomy of Propagation Models
In the area of network security, the propagation of malicious information has been
studied for a long time [93, 101, 111]. Researchers have proposed many models in
order to understand the propagation dynamics of Internet malicious information. We
show the taxonomy of these models in Fig.2.1.
Initially early works mainly refered to the academic thought on epidemic propa-
gation and thus, models were constructed according to the state transition of each
user [10,64,65,75]. As shown in Fig.2.1A, there are four classes of propagation mod-
els, deﬁned by whether infected users can become susceptible again after recovery. If
this is true, the models are called SIS models because users can change their status
as Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) [75]. If infected, users cannot become sus-
ceptible again once they are cured, and these models are called Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) [10,64,65] models. Users can only have a status transition as SIR or
Susceptible-Infectious (SI) models [112] if no infected users can recover. If susceptible
11
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Figure 2.1: The taxonomy of current models: (A) the consideration of diﬀerent recovery
processes; (B) the consideration of diﬀerent modeling methods
users can be directly immunized and never become infected, the models are called
Susceptible-Infected-Immunized (SII) models [23, 96, 97, 110].
We show the state transition graph of each type of model in Fig.2.2, whereas I∗
in Fig.2.2D means the immunized state. Currently, almost all models are derived
from the above model types. We assume S(t), I(t) and R(t) to be the number of
susceptible, infected and recovered users in networks. We also assume β and α to be
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Figure 2.2: (A) SI model; (B) SIS model; (C) SIR model; (D) SII model.
the contact rate and the recovery rate of users. Then, we have the SIS model as
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dS(t)
dt = −βI(t)(N − I(t)) + αI(t)
dI(t)
dt = βI(t)(N − I(t))− αI(t)
(2.1.1)
whereas N is the number of nodes in networks. We also have the SIR model as⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dS(t)
dt = −βI(t)(N − I(t)−R(t))
dI(t)
dt = βI(t)(N − I(t))− αI(t)
dR(t)
dt = αI(t)
(2.1.2)
We further have the SII model as⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dS(t)
dt = [α− βI(t)] · [N − I(t)− I∗(t)]
dI(t)
dt = βI(t)[N − I(t)]− αI(t)
dI∗(t)
dt = α[N − I∗(t)]
(2.1.3)
On the basis of the SI, SIS, SIR and SII models, researchers derived the epidemic
threshold of SIS models on topological networks [18, 40, 83, 90]. Wang et al. [90] ﬁrst
presented general formulas based on the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of a
topological graph. Later, Ganesh et al. [40] formalized this approach and further
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derived the lifetime approximation of an epidemic on topological networks. These
works suggest that if an epidemic dies out, then it is necessarily true that
β
α
< th =
1
λ
(2.1.4)
whereas λ is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A of network topologies.
The variable th is the threshold. When the rate β
α
is smaller than the threshold, the
number of infected users in networks will not be extinct. When the rate β
α
is equal
to the threshold, the number of infected users linearly decreases with time t. At
last, when the rate β
α
is larger than the threshold, the number of infected users will
decrease exponentially.
There are still other works based on the SI, SIS, SIR and SII models. For example,
the works of [58, 81] propose methods to locate the origins of the propagation of
Internet malicious information. In their works, the authors adopt SI models to present
the propagation dynamics of malicious information.
2.1.2 Typical Propagation Models
According to diﬀerent modeling methods, we obtain another taxonomy tree. As
shown in Fig.2.1B, there are two major categories: scanning-based propagation mod-
els and topological-based propagation models. In this thesis, we mainly focus on the
topological-based propagation models. Readers who are interested in scanning-based
propagation models could refer to the works of [93, 101, 111]. In this section, we will
mainly discuss typical models according to the taxonomy in Fig.2.1B.
1) Simulation Models : Currently, there are some works that rely on simu-
lations [36, 42, 103, 112]. If we take Zou’s work as an example, it [112] presents a
simulation model on the propagation of email worms. It considered the probability
14
of opening an email attachment and email checking frequency, and then compared
the propagation of the Internet email worm on power law topologies, small world
topologies and random graph topologies. In the proposed model, the probability of
each user opening a worm attachment can be treated as an infected probability and
the distribution of email checking times can represent the propagation probability.
Due to the high likelihood that email users will also receive an email from those
they send an email to, the Internet’s email network is modeled as an undirected
graph. According to the distribution of Yahoo email groups, Zou et al. believe this
Internet email network conforms to a heavy-tailed distribution and the email network
topology can be modeled as a power law network, which follows F (k) ∝ k−α. The
constant α is the power-law exponent that determines the degrees of nodes in the
network. A larger maximum topology degree requires a larger power law exponent,
and a larger expected value of topology degree demands a smaller power law exponent.
This model uses α = 1.7 to generate the power law network with the total number
of hosts |V |= 100000, and an average degree of 8. The highest degree for this power
law network is 1833 and the lowest degree is 3.
Email worms depend on the interaction of email users to spread. When a user
checks an email with a malicious attachment, this user may discard it or open the
worm attachment without any security awareness. This user’s behavior is represented
by an opening probability C ∼ N(0.5, 0.32) in this model. Then, when a malicious
email attachment is opened, the email worm immediately infects the user and sends
out a worm email to all email addresses found on this user’s computer. Thus, the
email checking time is an important parameter that contributes to the propagation
speed of the email worm. In this simulation model, the email checking time T follows
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a Gaussian distribution: T ∼ N(40, 202). This model discusses two cases under
diﬀerent infection assumptions: non-reinfection and reinfection. The main diﬀerence
is whether a user in the infectious state can be infected again. If the victims can
be infected each time a worm visits them, it is assumed to be a reinfection scenario.
Otherwise, infected users only send out worm copies once even if they open a worm
attachment again. We refer to this as a non-reinfection scenario. The other simulation
models [36, 42, 103] are similar to the simulation model of email worms.
2) 0-1 Logical Models: Fan and Xiang [37] used a logic matrix approach to
model the spread of the P2P worm, a kind of computer virus that spreads in the
Internet. They presented two diﬀerent topologies: a simple random graph topology
and a pseudo power law topology. The research studied their impact on the perfor-
mance of a P2P worm’s attack and analyzed related quarantine strategies for these
two topologies. This model uses a logic matrix (denoted by matrix T ) to represent
the topology of a P2P overlay network. It adopts two constants of logic type (True
or 1, False or 0) as the value of matrix variables. The logic constant ‘T’ indicates the
existence of a directed link between two nodes in the network, and the logic constant
‘F’ is used to indicate there is no directed link. The i-th row of a topology logic
matrix represents all outbound links of node i, and the j-th column of the topology
logic matrix represents all inbound links of node j. This 0-1 matrix stands for the
propagation ability of nodes, i.e., whether they can allow the virus to spread or not.
This logic 0-1 matrix model is a discrete-time deterministic propagation model of P2P
worms under three diﬀerent distributions: infectious state (denoted by logic vector
S), vulnerability status (denoted by logic vector V ) and quarantine status (denoted
by logic vector Q). Where the logic vector Sg represents the current state g of the
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logical P2P overlay network and the logic vector Sg+1 represents the next state of the
logical P2P overlay network, we have
Sg+1 = Sg + SgT (2.1.5)
If none of the nodes are vulnerable to the worm and no nodes are quarantined, then
we have
Sg+1 = Sg + SgTV (2.1.6)
If all nodes are vulnerable and some nodes are quarantined, then we have
Sg+1 = Sg + SgTQ (2.1.7)
where Q stands for the distribution of those unquarantined nodes.
This logic 0-1 matrix model translates the propagation processes of P2P worms
into a sequence of logic matrix operations. According to the analysis of this model,
authors of [37] discovered the relation between outdegree, vulnerability and coverage
rate in power law topologies and simple random graph topologies respectively, and
then proposed quarantine strategies against P2P worms.
3) Epidemic models: Because the simple epidemic model presented in Section
2.1.1 is not appropriate for modeling epidemic spreading in topological networks, some
researchers [10,64,65,75] have presented new topological models by distinguishing the
diﬀerent dynamics of nodes with diﬀerent degrees.
Suppose, in a topological network, P (k) is the fraction of nodes that have degree
k. The average degree of the network is E(k) =
∑
k kP (k). We denote ik(t) as the
fraction of infected hosts in the k-degree host set. The infection rate is denoted by
λ, which is the probability a susceptible node is infected by one neighboring infected
node within a unit time. The diﬀerential equation model for nodes with degree k is
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presented in the work of [64].
dik(t)
dt
= λk[1− ik(t)]θ(t) (2.1.8)
θ(t) =
∑
n nP (n)in(t)
E[k]
(2.1.9)
The factor θ(t) is “the probability that any given link points to an infected host” [75].
Boguna et al. [10] improved the model by considering that “since the infected vertex
under consideration received the disease through a particular edge that cannot be
used for transmission anymore, the correct probability must consider one less edge.”
They modiﬁed the formula of θ(t) as
θ(t) =
∑
n(n− 1)P (n)in(t)
E[k]
(2.1.10)
When a node has more edges, it has a higher probability of being quickly infected by
an epidemic (or an email worm). Since the above two models diﬀerentiate nodes with
diﬀerent degrees, they provide better modeling for a topological epidemic spreading
than the homogeneous model.
4) Spatial-temporal models: In the work of Chen and Ji [24], a spatial-
temporal random process was used to describe the statistical dependence of malware
propagation in arbitrary topologies. This spatial-temporal model is a stochastic dis-
crete time model that reﬂects the temporal dependence and the spatial dependence
in the propagation of malware. The temporal dependence means the status of node
i (infected or susceptible) at time t + 1 depends on the status of node i at time t
and the status of its neighbors at time t. The temporal dependence of node i can be
shown as follows:
P (Xi(t+ 1) = 0 | Xi(t) = 0) = δi (2.1.11)
P (Xi(t+ 1) = 0 | Xi(t) = 0, XNi(t) = xNi(t)) = βi (2.1.12)
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where Xi(t) denotes the status of a network node i at time t (t represents discrete
time): if node i is infected at time, Xi(t) = 1; if node i is susceptible at time t,
Xi(t) = 0. xNi(t) is used to denote the status of all neighbors of node i at time t
and the vector xNi(t) is the realization of XNi(t). If node i is susceptible at time t, it
can be compromised by any of its infected neighbors and become infected at the next
time step t+ 1 with a birth rate βi(t). Otherwise, node i is infected and has a death
rate δi to recover at the next time step t+1. The transition probabilities characterize
the temporal evolution due to infection and recovery.
Denoted by Ri(t), the probability that node i recovers from infected to susceptible
status at time t+ 1, is as follows
Ri(t) = P (Xi(t+ 1) = 0, Xi(t) = 1) = δiP (Xi(t) = 1) (2.1.13)
If node i is susceptible at time t, the probability that node i remains susceptible at
the next time step can be deﬁned as
Si(t) =
∑
Ni
[P (XNi(t) = xNi(t) | Xi(t) = 0) · (1− βi(t))] (2.1.14)
where a joint probability P (XNi(t) = xNi(t) | Xi(t) = 0) representing the status of
all neighbors of node i at time t characterizes the spatial dependence according to
the network topology and the interaction between nodes. Then, the probability that
node i is infected at time t+ 1 can be represented by the following computation,
P (Xi(t+ 1) = 1) = 1−Ri(t)− Si(t)P (Xi(t) = 0) (2.1.15)
Then, the expected number of infected nodes at time t, n(t), can be obtained by
n(t) = E(
M∑
i=1
Xi(t)) =
M∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = 0) (2.1.16)
Authors of [24] presented two models to simplify the above challenge posed by the
spatial dependence: the Independent Model and the Markov Model. The Independent
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Model assumes the status of all nodes at time t is spatially independent. This means
no propagation cycles are formed when worms propagate via some intermediate nodes
because the infected probability of a node is not inﬂuenced by its neighbors. Thus,
the independent model neglects the spatial dependence. However, the status of a
node at a given time is related to its status at the last time tick and thus, it still
remains temporally dependent. We can compute the value of Sindi (t) as
Sindi (t) =
∏
j∈Ni
[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1)] (2.1.17)
The Markov Model assumes the status of a node is related to its neighbors, but its
neighbors cannot inﬂuence each other at the same time. This assumption can result
in propagation cycles via a single intermediate node, however this can be solved with
conditional independence in the network space. We can also compute the value of
SMari (t) as
SMari (t) =
∏
j∈Ni
[1− βjiP (Xj(t) = 1 | Xi(t) = 0)] (2.1.18)
On the basis of spatial-temporal models, researchers can capture the exact impacts of
topologies to the propagation of malicious information. Later, we extend this model
to present the propagation of speciﬁc malicious information in social networks, such
as the work of [96,97]. Besides, Wang et al. employed the spatial-temporal model to
estimate the threshold of malicious information dying out [90].
5) ICM and LTM : In previous works, the independent cascade model (ICM)
[9, 13, 20, 21, 26, 49, 52, 82] and the linear threshold model (LTM) [11, 26, 46, 49] were
two primary models for the propagation of both positive and negative information in
OSNs.
In the ICM model, there exists a set of nodes that are initially active (seed nodes)
while the rest of the nodes are inactive. Inﬂuence propagation unfolds in discrete
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steps following a randomized process. When a node v becomes active in time step
d, it has a single chance to activate each of its inactive neighbors w with probability
pv,w at time step d + 1. If v succeeds, w becomes active at d + 1. However, if v
fails, it does not get another chance to turn w active. The process of the conversion
of nodes from the inactive to the active state continues, till no further activation is
possible. In the LTM model, there will be a threshold for the spread process. Given
a susceptible node, if the number of infected neighbors exceeds the threshold at time
t, the node becomes infected at time t+ 1.
ICM is basically a simulation model. LTM provides a deterministic spread process,
but each node in LTM is either absolutely ‘active’ or ‘inactive’. Thus, LTM is also
closer to a simulation model rather than an analytical one. In a simulation, it is
possible to ﬁnd the probability of being in a state by averaging over many runs, but
this does not express the reasons why an initial set of parameters leads to the results
it does. Moreover, people in ICM and LTM are limited to two basic states of believing
either positive or negative information. This is far from being enough to represent
social behavioral diﬀerences to which we have referred before. Additionally, the LCM
and LTM family of models do not take temporal dynamics into account. These
include the frequency people check social news and the time they take to forward the
information. Thus, their results may largely deviate from the real spreading dynamics
in OSNs.
2.2 Methods of Restraining Rumors
Scientists have proposed many methods in order to restrain the propagation of rumors,
such as controlling inﬂuential users [7,28–30,32,37,42,47,50,57,61,66,76,80,96,103,
21
ZĞƐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ
ZƵŵŽƌƐ
/ŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů
EŽĚĞƐ
ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
ƌŝĚŐĞƐ
ZĞŵĞĚŝĂů
DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
ĞŐƌĞĞ
ŽƌĞ
ĞƚǁĞĞŶŶĞƐƐ
KǀĞƌůĂƉƉĞĚ
^ĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚ
WƌŽĂĐƚŝǀĞ
DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ
dƌƵƚŚ
ůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
Figure 2.3: The taxonomy of the methods used to restrain the spread of rumors in online
social networks.
112], controlling bridges of social communities [22,27,54,71–74,87,108] and clarifying
the rumors by spreading truths [13,41,43,55,82,85]. We show the taxonomy of these
methods in Fig.2.3.
2.2.1 Controlling Inﬂuential Users
The most common but popular method is to monitor a group of inﬂuential users and
block their outward communication when rumors are detected on them. According
to the way they choose the inﬂuential users, we categorise current methods into three
types: degree, betweenness and core.
1) Degree : The most direct and intuitive methods [7,28,30,32,37,61,66,76,103,
112] control popular OSN users. In social graphs, these users correspond to the nodes
with large degrees in OSNs. The theoretical bases of these methods are the scale-free
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Figure 2.4: Restraining the rumors by controlling the inﬂuential nodes. A: the inﬂuential
nodes are those of a large degree; B: the inﬂuential nodes are those of large betweenness;
C: the inﬂuential nodes are those in the innermost core.
and power-law properties of Internet matters. A few highly-connected nodes play a
vital role in maintaining the network’s connectivity [35,69]. We illustrate this method
in Fig.2.4A. We can see that when adequate popular users are controlled in OSNs,
the spread of rumors will be limited in a small branch of the whole topology.
2) Betweenness : Researchers have found that some nodes that do not have large
degrees in topologies also play a vital role in the dissemination of social information.
As shown in Fig.2.4B, the degree of node E is smaller than node A, B, C and D.
However, node E is noticeably more important to the spread of rumors as it is the
connector of two large groups of users. To locate this kind of node in OSNs, scientists
introduced the measure of betweenness, which stands for the number of shortest paths
passing through a given node [39]. We can also ﬁnd other variants of betweenness,
such as RW betweenness [68]. The work of [29, 42, 47, 57, 96] argued that controlling
the nodes with higher betweenness values is more eﬃcient than controlling those with
higher degrees.
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Figure 2.5: Restraining the rumors by controlling the bridges between communities. A:
communities are overlapped; B: communities are separated.
3) Core : In this case, the network topologies are decomposed using k -shell analy-
sis. Some researchers have found the most eﬃcient rumor spreaders are those located
within the core of the OSNs, as identiﬁed by the decomposition analysis [50,80]. We
illustrate this viewpoint in Fig.2.4C. We can see the nodes in the innermost compo-
nent of the network may possibly have smaller degrees, but they contribute to the
kernel of the network and build the connectivity between the outside components.
Thus, the nodes in the core are more crucial for restraining the rumors in OSNs.
2.2.2 Controlling Community Bridges
Most real OSNs typically contain parts in which the nodes are more highly connected
to each other than to the rest of the network. Sets of these nodes are usually called
communities in OSNs. Existing methods used to identify communities mainly have
two types: ﬁnding overlapped communities [73,74] and ﬁnding separated communities
[22, 27, 54, 71, 72, 87, 108].
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1) Overlapped : Every OSN user in the real world has numerous roles. For ex-
ample, if a user is a student, he or she belongs to a schoolmate community. This
user may also belong to a family community and various hobby communities. There-
fore, most actual OSNs are made of highly overlapping cohesive groups of users [74].
The nodes that are located in more than one community are the bridges between
communities. The bridges forward the information from one community to another.
If we control the bridges and block the spread of rumors on them, the scale of the
rumors’ propagation will be limited to the local community. We illustrate this kind
of methods [73, 74] in Fig. 2.5A.
2) Separated : Some researchers [22,27,54,71,72,87,108] extract social relation-
ship graphs by partitioning the topologies of OSNs into numerous separated com-
munities. The premise of these methods is that users are more likely to receive and
forward information from their social friends. Thus, these separated communities are
representative of the most likely propagation paths of the rumors and the truths.
Compared with overlapped communities, the bridges are the nodes that have out-
ward connections to the nodes of other communities. As shown in Fig.2.5B, when
the bridges between separated communities are controlled, the spread of rumors will
also be limited to a small scale.
2.2.3 Clariﬁcation Through Spreading Truths
Except for banning the outward communication on inﬂuential users or community
bridges, people can adopt the strategy of spreading truths [13,41,43,55,82,85] to the
public in order to eliminate critical rumors. As shown in Fig. 2.6, the scale of the
rumors’ propagation will be restrained after the truths start to spread. In the real
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Figure 2.6: Restraining the rumors by spreading truth in OSNs.
world, this strategy respects the freedom of speech, but its eﬃciency is highly related
to the credibility of the truth origins. If the origins of the truths have high prestige
among the masses, people will deﬁnitely accept the truths when both the rumors
and the truths are received. Otherwise, people make decisions using the “minority is
subordinate to majority” rule. We will model and elaborate the processes of people
making choices in Section 6.2.3.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Propagation Dynamics of
Social Network Worms
3.1 Introduction
The popularity of social network applications such as Facebook, MySpace and Twitter
has grown in recent years [69]. Unfortunately, criminal networks are growing at a
rate equal to the social networking platforms upon which they parasitically feed.
Representative examples are worms like Koobface spreading in Facebook and the
“Here you are” email worm that emerged in 2010. According to the Symantec Internet
threats report [38], social network worms and resembling attacks account for a quarter
of the total threats in 2009 and nearly one ﬁfth of the total threats in 2010.
Social networks have become attractive targets for worm creators because of the
following characteristics. Firstly, they rely on information like contact lists contained
in a victim’s machine to locate new targets. This intelligent mechanism allows far
more eﬃcient propagation than traditional scanning worms that make a large num-
ber of wild guesses for every successful infection [94]. Secondly, by using social engi-
neering techniques that exploit trust in social networks, many users fail to recognize
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malicious codes sent by their friends and subsequently become infected. This result-
s in a wide range that worms propagate to. Thirdly, researchers have found that
social networks exhibit both small world properties and scale-free behaviors [32, 62].
This means the spreading of social network worms can be incredibly fast because
the highly connected “hub” nodes of a scale-free network and the short paths in a
strongly clustered small world will greatly facilitate the propagation of an infection
over the whole network.
3.1.1 Motivation
In order to understand and allow for addressing of defense strategies against social
network worms, scientists have done a lot of work over the last decade. For example,
early work mainly refers to academic thoughts about epidemic propagation, including
the Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS) model [75] and the Susceptible-Infectious-
Recovered (SIR) model [10,64,65]. Later, the work of [24] presents a spatial-temporal
model, while the work of [36, 42, 103, 112] relies on simulation models, and the work
of [25] develops an SI model on a speciﬁc social network of smart phones. Moreover,
on the basis of SIS models, the work of [18, 40, 83, 90] focuses on ﬁnding threshold
conditions for the fast extinction of worms.
Although a number of signiﬁcant works have been undertaken, there are two
critical problems that need to be solved seriously aﬀect the accuracy of modeling the
propagation of social network worms. Firstly, the spread of social network worms
depends on human involvement. That is, Internet users periodically check their newly
arrived emails or messages, and are lured to open those which are actually worm
copies. The period for checking these emails or messages depends on the patterns
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of users. However, the temporal dynamics, which are to model the spread of worms
with diﬀerent checking time periods of users, have not been implemented in previous
work. Most previous models, such as [24, 83], assume a user begins infecting others
at the moment the user is infected, which means the checking periods of users are
identical and assumed to be one. Thus, previous models cannot present an accurate
and realistic spreading procedure. Secondly, the spreading of social network worms
relies on the topology of social networks. In the modeling, the probability of a node
being infected will increase when its neighbors have been infected. However, the
increasing part in the probability cannot reversely increase the probabilities of its
neighbors being infected. Otherwise, the modeling will have redundant computation.
This is the problem of spatial dependence. Previous analytical works, such as [18,90],
simplify this problem and assume nodes to be spatially independent. Our empirical
study shows their works greatly overestimate the number of infected users (see Section
4 of the supplementary ﬁle). In order to solve these two problems, we are motivated to
propose a Susceptible-Infectious-Immunized (SII) model which can precisely present
the propagation dynamics of social network worms.
3.1.2 Contributions
The primary contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• We carry out extensive analysis on two important problems, temporal dynam-
ics and spatial dependence, which crucially aﬀect the accuracy of the existing
analytical models. Our analysis shows that previous work cannot model the re-
alistic propagation with diﬀerent time checking periods of users. Moreover, the
analysis shows the spreading cycles formed in the modeling lead to considerable
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errors in estimating the infection probabilities.
• We propose a novel SII model. This model implements a spatial-temporal syn-
chronization process, which helps us solve the problem of modeling temporal
dynamics. Furthermore, by eliminating the eﬀect of those cycles, the SII model
overcomes the computational challenge and provides a stronger approximation
of spatial dependence.
• We conduct a number of experiments to evaluate the proposed SII model. The
results show that our SII model is superior to the state-of-the-art models for
the spread of social network worms, which include the epidemic models, the
spatial-temporal model, the SIS model, and the SIR model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the basis
of social network worms. Section 3.3 states the problems in the modeling of social
network worms. Section 3.4 explains the details of our SII model. Section 3.5 im-
plements a series of experiments to evaluate the correctness of our model. Further
discussion and related work are presented in Section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. Finally,
Section 3.8 concludes this chapter.
3.2 The Spread of Social Network Worms
3.2.1 Social Network Worm Primer
Social network worms leverage social platforms to send worm email copies or messages
containing malicious links. Once the recipients are lured to read the infectious email
attachments or visit the malicious web links, they will become infected and start
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Figure 3.1: The state transition graph of a user.
spreading worm copies or links to their friends found in the contact lists, such as
email address lists. Diﬀerent from scanning worms, the spread of social network
worms mainly depends on the topology of social networks and needs a lot of human
involvement.
In the early stage of the propagation, users have no knowledge of the newly emerg-
ing worm. After scientists detect it and encourage users to update their antivirus
software, or when users become more skeptical of the emails or links which seem
out-of-character, the infected computers will be cleaned and the momentum of the
spreading will slow down until the worms become extinct in the network. We provide
the state transition graph of a user in Fig. 3.1.
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3.2.2 Social Network Topology Characters
Social network topologies have the following characters: 1) they can be thought of as
a “semi-directed network”, a graph in which some edges are directed and others are
undirected [62, 70]. In this chapter, we use reciprocity rate to depict the fraction of
edges which point back to the sources; 2) the indegree of nodes tends to match the
outdegree [62, 70]. We simply let the outdegree be equal to indegree and both follow
the power-law distribution [6, 32, 62, 75]; 3) users who have large groups of friends in
social networks tend to appear in the contact lists of many others [70]. Thus, any edge
from one node to another node is chosen by the large-degree-preferential principle; 4)
the weight of each edge denotes the probability of an unwary user reading malicious
messages from their friends. This probability is determined by the human factor.
Similar to [112], we let it follow Gaussian distribution.
Existing works of [10, 24, 112] have shown topological factors strongly aﬀect the
spreading speed and scale. In this chapter, we derive the structure of topologies
on the basis of previous statistical analysis in real social networks [6, 32, 62, 70, 103].
The topologies are generated through the 2K-series method which was proposed and
veriﬁed by P. Mahadevan et al. [59]. The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1
of the supplementary work [98].
3.3 Problem Statement
For the convenience of description in the following, we use neighbors Ni instead of
friends of user i, and messages instead of those malicious attachments or links, if not
otherwise stated. We also let Ti denote the message checking period of user i.
32
FKHFN FKHFNFKHFNFKHFNFKHFN
FKHFN FKHFN
FKHFN FKHFN
7N 
8VHU L
8VHU M
8VHU N
FKHFN
7M 
7L 
7,0(
7,0(
7,0(
W
LQIHFW
LQIHFW
FKHFN
FKHFN
W WWWWW
WWWW
W W
Figure 3.2: An example to explain why previous models have not presented accurate
temporal dynamics on users in the propagation.
3.3.1 The problem of temporal dynamics
Previous models [10, 18, 24, 25, 64, 65] assume users check newly arrived messages at
every moment and the message checking time Ti is identical for each user (usually
one time interval). This means any malicious messages that arrive at node i at time
t, will be deﬁnitely opened and possibly forwarded to their neighbors Ni at time t.
These neighbors repeat this process at time t + 1 and the neighbors of Ni do so at
time t+2, and so forth. This process is equivalent to k-hop modeling where the value
k means the number of edges from the initial infectious node to the current node i.
In the real world, users have diﬀerent message checking time. We take Fig. 3.2
as an example: user k is a neighbor of both user i and user j in a social network.
In the previous models, if node i and node j are compromised at their ﬁrst checking
time (t5 and t16), they will send worm copies to user k and possibly infect user k at
the second checking time of user k (t14). Considering the diﬀerent message checking
time of users, user i is compromised at t5 (the ﬁrst checking time of user i), and the
malicious message from user i will only be read by user k at t7 (the ﬁrst checking
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time of user k) rather than t14 (the second checking time of user k). Besides, user j
is infected at t16 (the ﬁrst checking time of user j), and the malicious message from
user j will be read by user k at t21 (the third checking time of user k) rather than
t14. Thus, previous k-hop models suﬀer from the problem of temporal dynamics. To
solve this problem, we derive a concept as:
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. If the state of node i being infected is timekeeping with its compro-
mised neighbors sending malicious messages (spatial factor) and the message checking
time for possibly visiting those messages (temporal factor), we call this process “the
spatial-temporal synchronization process”.
This deﬁnition means the modeling needs to record and accumulate every
newly arrived malicious message in an arbitrary Ti, and calculate the joint infection
probability of those messages when a user checks them.
In order to demonstrate the importance of this process, we further compare the
previous analytical models with our simulation. The results show the problem of
temporal dynamics is critical in previous models. The details are in Section 3 of the
supplementary work [98].
3.3.2 The problem of Spatial Dependence
We use a small episode of a social network to depict the spatial dependence. As shown
in Fig. 3.3, there are two spreading paths: 1→2→3→4→5→2 and 1→2→6→3→7→4
→5→2. In the analytical modeling, the event of a node being infected is presented by
a probability at time t. Thus, the probability of node 5 being infected will increase
due to node 2 having been infected before. However, the increasing part in the
probability of node 5 being infected cannot further aﬀect the probability of node 2
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Figure 3.3: Worms spread in a small episode of a social network. Path 1 and 2 are
two examples for the propagation in the topology.
being infected. Otherwise, the probability of node 2 having been infected before will
be implicitly recounted, which causes overestimation of the number of infected nodes.
More importantly, we ﬁnd the essence of spatial dependence is the cycles formed in
the spreading paths [91]. Based on the number of intermediate nodes in a cycle, we
derive a concept as:
Deﬁnition 3.3.2. If a spreading path originates from an arbitrary node i, passes
through k intermediate nodes, and then returns to node i, we call this spreading path
a “k-order cycle”.
In Fig. 3.3, there is a 3-order cycle (2→3→4→5→2) and a 5-order cycle (2→6
→3→7→4→5→2) on node 2. To realize the spatial dependence, we have to trace
each spreading cycle and remove their eﬀect to avoid overestimation.
Through empirical analysis on the social topologies, we ﬁnd the cycles from 1-order
to 5-order have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the propagation. Thus, we need to remove the
eﬀect of 1-order to 5-order cycles in the modeling. Previous Markov approximation
which focuses on removing only 1-order cycles is not enough. Detailed analysis is
shown in Section 4 of the supplementary work [98].
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Table 3.1: Major Notations Used in This Chapter
Symbol Explanation
Ti Email checking time of user i.
r(t) The recovery function of users, which provides the probability
for any user to be immunized at time t.
Xi(t) The state of a network node i at time t: “Sus.” susceptible,
“Imm.” immunized, “Act.” active and “Dor.” dormant.
pij The probability of user j reading malicious messages from i.
openi(t) The event of user i checking newly arrived emails at time t.
τ The arbitrary time between the time of user i last checking
emails and the current time t (excluding t).
M The size of the social network.
Ni The set of neighboring nodes of node i.
n(t) The number of infected nodes in the social network at time t.
v(i, t) The infection probability of node i at time t.
s(i, t) The probability of user i reading malicious messages from
neighboring nodes at time t.
Cij An arbitrary spreading path from node i to node j.
Θ(t) The probability for node j being infected by node i through
spreading path Cij at time t.
Hi The extended set of Ni (Hi = Ni|N +Ni|R +Ni|S).
Δ(Cij) The probabilistic eﬀect of Cij to the propagation modeling.
φ(t, Cij) The beginning time of the spreading path Cij .
3.4 SII Model
3.4.1 Modeling nodes, topology and events of users
Nodes and topology information are basic elements for the propagation of social
network worms. Given a social network, we derive the topology of it. A node in the
topology presents a user in the social network. Let random variable Xi(t) denote the
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Figure 3.4: State transition graph of a node in the topology.
state of a node i at discrete time t. Then, we have
Xi(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Hea., healthy
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Sus., susceptible
Imm., immunized
Inf., infected
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Act., active
Dor., dormant
(3.4.1)
We derive the state transition graph of an arbitrary node i in a social network. As
shown in Fig. 3.4, node i transits to the infected state if it is at the susceptible state.
The infection probability is presented by v(i, t). A user is infectious at the active
state. The node of this user will then stay at the dormant state until it is immunized.
Moreover, no matter which state the node is at, it may transit to the immunized
state. The recovery probability is presented by r(t). For the convenience of readers,
we list major notations of this chapter in Table 3.1.
In the SII model, we propose employing an M by M square matrix with elements
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Figure 3.5: Diﬀerent cases of variable τ . (a) User checks new emails at current time
t; (b) user does not check emails at current time t.
pij to describe a topology consisting of M nodes, as in⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
p11 · · · p1M
... pij
...
pM1 · · · pMM
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ pij ∈ [0, 1] (3.4.2)
wherein pij represents the probability of user j reading malicious messages from user
i. pij = 0 means no contact between node i and j. Therefore, the matrix reﬂects the
topology of a social network.
The infection of social network worms relies on unwary users checking malicious
messages. To properly model this process, we introduce two new variables. Firstly,
we deﬁne a random variable openi(t). We have openi(t) = 1 if the user is checking
new messages at time t, otherwise openi(t) = 0. The probability of a user checking
messages is determined by the value of Ti. Thus, we have
P (openi(t) = 1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, otherwise
1, t mod Ti = 0
(3.4.3)
Secondly, it is signiﬁcant to obtain the number of unread messages of each user at
current time t. These messages may arrive at the users at an arbitrary time between
the users last checking new messages and the current time t (excluding t). Thus, we
introduce a variable τ to indicate the arbitrary time. As shown in Fig. 3.5, the value
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of τ has two forms depending on whether a user checks messages at current time t or
not. Then, we have ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
t− Ti ≤ τ < t, if openi(t) = 1
t− (t mod Ti) ≤ τ < t, otherwise
(3.4.4)
A compromised user can only spread worm copies to neighboring users in social
networks. Thus, for each user in a network, we record and accumulate every newly
arrived malicious message from neighboring users at each τ , and then ﬁnally obtain
the joint infected probability of each user who checks those messages.
3.4.2 Modeling propagation dynamics
We use the values 0 and 1 to substitute the healthy state and the infected state,
respectively. Given a topology of a social network withM nodes, the expected number
of infected users at time t, n(t), can be computed as in
n(t) = E
⎡
⎣ M∑
i=1
Xi(t)
⎤
⎦ =
M∑
i=1
E[Xi(t)] =
M∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = 1) =
M∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = Inf.) (3.4.5)
The expected number of infected nodes, n(t), is ascribed to the sum of the probabil-
ities of each node being infected at time t, P (Xi(t) = Inf.). As shown in Fig. 3.4,
a susceptible node can be compromised and be at the infected state, and an infected
node can be recovered and be at the immunized state. Based on the state transi-
tion graph, we derive the computation of P (Xi(t) = Inf.) by diﬀerence equations as
follows
P (Xi(t) = Inf.) = (1− r(t)) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.) + v(i, t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) (3.4.6)
For the computation of P (Xi(t) = Sus.), we have
P (Xi(t) = Sus.) = 1− P (Xi(t) = Inf.)− P (Xi(t) = Imm.) (3.4.7)
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Moreover, for the computation of P (Xi(t) = Imm.), we have
P (Xi(t) = Imm.) = P (Xi(t− 1) = Imm.) + r(t) · [1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Imm.)] (3.4.8)
Once we obtain the values of v(i, t) and r(t), the value of P (Xi(t) = Inf.) can be
computed by the iteration of the above equations (3.4.6), (3.4.7), (3.4.8). We provide
the algorithm of the iteration process in Section 5 of the supplementary ﬁle [98].
In fact, there are three preconditions for each infection of social network worms:
1) a user has not been immunized; 2) a user checks new messages; 3) a susceptible
user reads those malicious messages. When the ﬁrst and the second preconditions
are satisﬁed, we use s(i, t) to represent the probability of a susceptible user i read-
ing malicious messages from their neighboring nodes at time t. Then, the infection
probability v(i, t) can be derived as in
v(i, t) = s(i, t) · P (openi(t) = 1) · [1− r(t)] (3.4.9)
For each pair of neighboring users, when the second precondition is satisﬁed, the
probability of a susceptible user i reading malicious messages from user j at time t
is pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.). Here, the event Xj(τ) = Act. means node
j is infected and sends out malicious message copies to neighboring nodes at time τ .
Since Ni denotes the set of neighboring nodes of node i, we can compute s(i, t) as in
s(i, t) = 1−
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
(3.4.10)
Considering diﬀerent values the variable τ may take, we disassemble equation (3.4.10)
by excluding t− 1 from the range of value τ . There are two cases. Firstly, as shown
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Figure 3.6: Diﬀerent cases for the computation of s(i, t). (b) is diﬀerent from (a),
because user checks messages at time t− 1 in (b).
in Fig. 3.6a, a user does not check new messages at time t− 1. Thus, we have
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
=
∏
j∈Ni,τ =t−1
(
1− pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
·
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
= [1− s(i, t− 1)] ·
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
(3.4.11)
Secondly, as shown in Fig. 3.6b, a user checks new messages at time t − 1. Thus,
the malicious messages received at time t are those sent at time t− 1 by the infected
neighboring users. The variable τ only takes the value t− 1. In this case, we have
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
)
=
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
) (3.4.12)
Actually, the diﬀerence of equations (3.4.11), (3.4.12) is caused by a user checking
newly arrived messages at time t − 1. Thus, we can unify the computation of s(i, t)
as in
s(i, t) =1− {1− s(i, t− 1) · [1− P (openi(t− 1) = 1)]}·∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.)
) (3.4.13)
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Figure 3.7: An example of the propagation cycle on node i.
Through equations (3.4.9), (3.4.13), we implement the spatial-temporal synchroniza-
tion process in the SII model. Once the P (Xj(t−1) = Act.|Xi(t−1) = Sus.) and r(t)
are obtained, the expected number of infected nodes n(t) can be calculated through
iterations of previous diﬀerence equations.
3.4.3 Relaxing of the spatial dependence condition
The conditional probability P (Xj(t−1) = Act.|Xi(t? 1) = Sus.) in equation (3.4.13)
represents the spatial dependence between node i and node j. In Section 3.3.2, we
have explained that spatial dependence is essentially the spreading cycles formed in
the propagation procedure. Thus, to obtain the value of P (Xj(t−1) = Act.|Xi(t−1) =
Sus.), we need to: 1) ﬁnd out those cycles which start at node i, pass by node j and
return back to node i; 2) remove their eﬀects in the modeling.
Assume node i is a direct neighbor of node j. As shown in Fig. 3.7, if node i has
a k-hop spreading path to node j, we then have a k-order cycle which starts at node
i, passes by node j and returns back to node i. Actually, once a network topology is
created and presented in a matrix, we can ﬁnd out and record those k-hop spreading
paths by the iteration of this topology matrix. We introduce a variable Cij to denote
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Figure 3.8: An example to explain how the values of te and tl are computed in the
modeling procedure.
an arbitrary spreading path from node i to node j, and δ(Cij) as its probabilistic eﬀect
to the spreading. We also introduce φ(t, Cij) as the beginning time of the spreading
path Cij which ends at time t. Then, we are able to compute the probability for node
j being infected by node i through path Cij at time t, Θ(t), as in
Θ(t) = δ(Cij) · P (Xi(φ(t, Cij)) = Act.) (3.4.14)
The probability for node j being infected by its neighbors at time t is v(j, t). Assuming
there are a total H(k) k-hop spreading paths starting at node i, and ending at node
j, we can then remove the probabilistic eﬀect of those spreading paths, and obtain
the value of the spatial dependence condition as in
P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.|Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) = {1− 1− v(j, t− 1)∏K
k=1
∏H(k)
h=1 (1−Θh(t− 1))
} · P (Xj(t− 2) = Sus.)
(3.4.15)
wherein K is the maximal length of the spreading paths. If the values δ(Cij) and
φ(t, Cij) are obtained, equation (3.4.15) can be iterated with equation (3.4.9) and
(3.4.14) in the modeling.
The question is how to compute the beginning time of the spreading path Cij,
φ(t, Cij)? As shown in Fig.3.8, if node j is infected and sends messages to node i
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at time t − 1, we can derive the earliest time (tej) and the latest time (tlj) of
messages arriving at node j as t − 1 − Tj and t − 2 respectively. In addition, node
a is a neighbor of node j in Fig. 3.7. Because the latest time for node a sending
malicious messages to node j is at tlj − (tlj mod Ta), the value tla becomes tlj − (tlj
mod Ta) − 1. Besides, the messages arriving at node a after the time tej − (tej
mod Ta) will not be forwarded to node j before tej, and the value tea can be then
computed as tej − (tej mod Ta). Similarly, we can also derive the earliest and latest
time of messages arriving at node b and node i in Fig. 3.7. Actually, the beginning
time φ(t, Cij) ranges from tei to tli. If node i sends malicious messages to neighbors
Ni during the period of tei to tli, node i will possibly receive the messages originated
from itself.
For the convenience of description, we label the nodes in an arbitrary spreading
path Cij as the number 0 to k from i to j. Then, we have the earliest (te) and latest
(tl) time of messages arriving at each node in Cij as
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tek = t− Tk − 1
tlk = t− 2
(3.4.16)
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
tek−x = tek−x+1 − (tek−x+1 mod Tk−x)
tlk−x = tlk−x+1 − (tlk−x+1 mod Tk−x)− 1
x ∈ (0, k] (3.4.17)
when x = k, tek − x and tlk−x are actually the earliest and latest time of messages
arriving at node i, which means φ(t, Cij) falls in the time range [te0, tl0]. Assume E
is the set of edges in a Cij and U is the set of its nodes excluding node i and node j.
Then, we can also compute the probabilistic eﬀect of this path δ(Cij) by multiplying
the propagation probability of each edge in E and the probability of each node being
susceptible in U . The time for each node being infected in Cij, (th), can be obtained
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by looking back upon the computation of φ(t, Cij). That is
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
th1 = φ(t, Cij)− [φ(t, Cij) mod T1] + Tk
thx = thx−1 − (thx−1 mod Tx−1) + Tx−1
x ∈ (1, k] (3.4.18)
Then, the nodes in Cij should be susceptible in th−1. The computation of the values
δ(Cij) and φ(t, Cij) is shown in Algorithm 3 of the supplementary ﬁle [98]. Currently,
we are able to compute the value of P (Xj(t−1) = Act.|Xi(t−1) = Sus.) by removing
the eﬀect of spreading cycles using equation (3.4.15) between te0 to tl0.
3.5 Model Validation
In this ﬁeld, all existing research adopts simulation to evaluate analytical models,
such as [18,24]. In order to validate the correctness of the SII model, we draw an SII-
compatible propagation simulator from existing simulation models [36, 42, 103, 112].
The implementation is in C++ and Matlab7. The random numbers in experiments are
produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions. The topologies adopted for evaluation
are medium topologies (10000 nodes). The simulation results are aver-aged by 100
runs. The number of 100 comes from the discussion “how many simulation runs are
needed before we obtain a steady curve? [112]”. Each run takes 800 time intervals.
Each run of the spread has two infected nodes at the beginning randomly chosen from
the network. Moreover, we set the two nodes with a distance of 6 (the number of
edges between them) in the topology.
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Figure 3.9: The spread of social network worms modeled by SII models (with or with-
out removing cycles). Topology: α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.23, pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.2);
Message checking time: Ti ∼ Exp(40).
3.5.1 Test the performance of modeling of temporal dynam-
ics and spatial dependence
To evaluate the accuracy of our model, we conduct experiments with diﬀerent parame-
ter settings. Firstly, in order to exclude the impact of diﬀerent recovery processes, the
experiments were carried out without the recovery process (r(t) = 0) in this subsec-
tion. The topology has a power-law exponent α = 2.5, an average degree E(D) = 5.5
and a reciprocity rate λ = 0.23. The infection probability pij follows Gaussian distri-
bution N(0.5, 0.2). The checking time Ti follows Exponential Distribution Exp(40).
These parameter settings come from the previous work [70, 112].
Fig. 3.9 shows the modeling results of adopting diﬀerent approximations to spatial
dependence. We can see the approximation is quite close to the simulation when 1
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to 5-order cycles are removed. Since removing more cycles will lead to fewer conﬂicts
in the spread of worms, the result of removing 1 to 5-order cycles is better than
removing only 1-order cycle or never removing any cycles. Actually, the diﬀerences
come from the computation of equation (3.4.15). We assume φ(∞) = P (Xj(t− 1) =
Act.|Xi(t − 1) = Sus.) and use ϕ(K) to present the asymptotic value of ϕ(∞) by
removing 1 to K-order cycles. Then, we have
Δ(K) = ϕ(K − 1)− ϕ(K)
=
(1− v(j, t− 1)) · [1−∏H(K)h=1 (1−Θh(t− 1))]
γ
· P (Xj(t− 2) = Sus.)
(3.5.1)
wherein 0 < γ =
∏K
k=1
∏H(k)
h=1 (1−Θk(t− 1)) < 1. Because we have 0 < v(j, t− 1) < 1
and 0 < Θ(t− 1) < 1, we can prove that Δ(K) > 0, which leads to
ϕ(0) > ϕ(1) > · · · > ϕ(K) > ϕ(∞) (3.5.2)
This means the result of the SII model becomes more accurate when more cycles are
removed. Additionally, when K → ∞, we have
lim
K→∞
γ = 0, lim
K→∞
Θ(t− 1) = 0 (3.5.3)
which leads to
lim
K→∞
Δ(K)
K
= 0 (3.5.4)
This means Δ(K) is high order inﬁnitesimal to the value K(Δ(K) = o(K)) and the
approximating beneﬁt by removing K-order cycles decreases rapidly when the order
K increases. Therefore, it is not necessary to remove all the k-hop spreading paths
in the topology to approximate the spatial dependence. We have investigated the
eﬀect of spreading cycles in Section 3 of the supplementary ﬁle [98]. Because the 1 to
5-order cycles have noticeable eﬀects on the modeling, we mainly focus on the k-hops
cycles (k ≤ 5). This saves much computation.
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Figure 3.10: The comparison of diﬀerent models with message checking time: Ti ∼
Exp(40); topology: α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.23, pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.2).
We also compare the SII model (removing 1 to 5-order cycles) with other models.
As shown in Fig. 3.10, because the epidemic model [10] and the spatial-temporal
model [24] do not implement message checking time, the spread in their modeling is
actually determined by hops. When Ti = 40, the spreading of 1 hop will cost 40 time
intervals. As a result, their curves show stairway shapes, which largely deviate from
the simulation result.
SII models with diﬀerent Ti and pij values were also investigated. We have Case
1 (what if users check messages more frequently): Ti ∼ Exp(20), pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.2);
Case 2 (what if users are more vigilant against this worm): Ti ∼ Exp(40), pij ∼
N(0.25, 0.1). As shown in Fig. 3.10, the SII model, which has removed 1 to 5-order
cycles, achieves better accuracy. We also compare the results of these two cases with
other models under the same parameter settings. As shown in Fig. 3.11 and Fig. 3.12,
our SII model (removing 1 to 5-order cycles) is much better than previous epidemic
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Figure 3.11: The comparison of diﬀerent models with message checking time: Ti ∼
Exp(20); topology: α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.23, pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.2).
and spatial-temporal model.
Moreover, we investigate the accuracy of the SII model in diﬀerent topologies.
Compared with the topology settings used in Fig. [10] (α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ =
0.23), we have Case 1: (what if users have more friends on average in the network,
which means λ becomes smaller and E(D) becomes larger): α = 2.0, E(D) = 10,
λ = 0.23; Case 2 (what if users are more likely to add each other into their contacts,
which means λ becomes larger and the topology has more cycles): α = 2.5, E(D) =
5.5, λ = 0.5. As shown in Fig. 3.13, the results of our SII model still ﬁt the simulation
result by removing 1 to 5-order spreading cycles.
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Figure 3.12: The comparison of diﬀerent models with message checking time: Ti ∼
Exp(40); topology: α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.23, pij ∼ N(0.25, 0.1).
3.5.2 Test the performance of the SII model with the recov-
ery function r(t)
In the following experiments, we use the SII model which has removed the eﬀect of
1 to 5-order spreading cycles. Firstly, we evaluate the performance of the SII model
with diﬀerent recovery functions r(t): ‘Qualys ’, ‘Constant ’ and ‘Ratio’ (See details
in Section 7 of the Supplementary ﬁle). As shown in Fig. 3.14, the curves of our SII
models match the simulations well, even if the recovery functions are diﬀerent.
Considering the recovery function ‘Qualys’, we also evaluate our SII model with
diﬀerent settings of the ﬁrst discovery period (d) and the time for 50 percent decreasing
(D). This concerns two cases: Case 1 (if the worms are easily cleaned from infected
users, this means the number of infected users quickly decreases): d = 40 and the
variable D equals to 40, 80, 120 intervals; Case 2 (what if security experts detect new
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Figure 3.13: The accuracy of the SII model in diﬀerent topologies. Case 1: α = 2.0,
E(D) = 10, λ = 0.23; Case 2: α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.5.
worm incidents quickly): the variable d equals 40, 80, 120 intervals and D = 40. As
shown in Fig. 3.15, our SII model presents a good approximation to the simulation
result. When variable D is smaller, the speed of worms being cleaned is quicker. For
Case 2, as shown in Fig. 3.16, the curves of our SII models are close to the simulation
results, which indicates our SII model is accurate. We also ﬁnd the ﬁrst discovery
period d has a critical eﬀect on the spreading scale of social network worms. When
d is small, which means security experts detected this worm quickly, the spreading
scale will be largely constrained.
We also compare the SII model with SIS models [18, 24, 75] and SIR models [10,
64, 65]. The diﬀerence between these models is caused by diﬀerent considerations on
the state transition of nodes. In order to exclude the impact of other factors, we
derive the SIS and SIR model on the basis of the SII model. A susceptible user can
be immunized in the SII model, but in the SIR model this user cannot. Thus, we
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Figure 3.14: The accuracy of the SII model aﬀected by diﬀerent recovery functions:
Qualys, Constant and Ratio.
obtain an SIR model by revising equation (8) as P (Xi(t) = Imm.) = P (Xi(t− 1) =
Imm.) + r(t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.).
Moreover, there is no immunized state in the SIS model. An infected user recovers
and becomes susceptible again. Thus, we obtain an SIS model by setting P (Xi(t) =
Imm.) = 0. As shown in Fig. 3.17, the result of the SII model decreases more rapidly
than SIS and SIR models, and is closer to the simulation.
3.6 Further Discussion
There is still much work to be done on modeling the propagation of social network
worms. Firstly, the SII model proposed in this chapter mainly focuses on non-
reinfection worms [112], such as Melissa, Love Letter spreading in email networks
and Koobface spreading in Facebook. However, other popular social network worms
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Figure 3.15: The accuracy of recovery processes (Case 1: d = 40). Topology: α =
2.5, E(D) = 5.5, λ = 0.23; message checking time: Ti ∼ Exp(40); propagation
probability: pij ∼ N(0.25, 0.1).
spread in a more aggressive way called reinfection [14]. Reinfection allows users to
send out worm copies whenever they open malicious messages, regardless of whether
this user has previously been infected or not. Infected users also send out worm
copies when certain events are triggered, such as restarting computers. These kinds
of worms can spread faster than non-reinfection worms in social networks. We leave
the modeling of reinfection worms to Chapter 4.
Secondly, we use simulations to evaluate the proposed SII model in this chapter. In
real-world scenarios, the spread of most social network worms is typically impossible
to track given the directed, topological manner in which they spread. Some email
worms, like Nyxem [63], once compromising a computer, will automatically generate a
single http request for the URL of an online statistics page. However, as the report [63]
said, the statistics of Nyxem cannot present a precise investigation on the propagation
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of email worms due to legitimate access, repeated probes and DDoS attacks to the
web page. It should also be pointed out there is no real dataset available for the
evaluation of analytical models in this ﬁeld.
Thirdly, by implementing diﬀerent recovery functions r(t), our SII model can
be used to derive the best defense strategies, such as where, when and how many
users are needed to deploy defense so we can prevent social network worms from
spreading. For example, a common view for the preferable positions of defense is
the highly-connected users [37, 112] or those with the most active neighbors [103].
However, according to our latest investigation [96], the users with higher random
walk betweenness [68] or lower closeness values may be more suitable for slowing
down the spread of social network worms. We will investigate the optimal defense
and locating the most inﬂuential network nodes in Chapter 7.
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Finally, we have a simple assumption in the modeling; that is users check social
messages periodically. However, in the real world, the message checking time is
more varied than assumed here. A possible solution is to presume the non-periodic
checking time for each user in the implementation of modeling. We leave this part of
the discussion to future work.
3.7 Related Work for This Chapter
There has been substantial eﬀort in modeling the propagation dynamics of Internet
worms over the last decade. Researchers mainly focus on two diﬀerent spreading
mechanisms [94]: the scanning-based spread and the topology-based spread. The
former relies on infectious nodes searching victims that contain vulnerabilities in the
55
whole or a speciﬁc IP space. The later depends on infectious nodes sending malicious
messages to their topological neighbors, luring them to open those messages and then
get infected. Readers can ﬁnd scanning-based models in two surveys from [101,111].
The propagation of social network worms belongs to the topology-based spread. In
this section, we mainly discuss this kind of model.
Firstly, based on whether infected users return to a susceptible state after being
recovered, previous models can be classiﬁed into SIS [18,40,75,83,90] and SIR models
[10,64,65]. However, considering the spread character of social network worms, after
users clean their infected computers or become more vigilant against a worm, they are
unlikely to be infected again. Thus, SIS models [18,40,75,83,90] are not appropriate
for modeling the spread of social network worms. SIR models [10, 64, 65] may suit
for the propagation of social network worms, but a more realistic scenario is that a
susceptible user can be immunized directly without ﬁrst being infected, such as the
consideration in modeling scanning worms [23, 110]. Moreover, as discussed in [112],
early epidemic models [10,64,65,75] greatly over-estimate the spreading speed due to
their implicit ‘homogeneous mixing’ assumption.
Secondly, the works of [36, 42, 103, 112] rely on simulations to model the propa-
gation of social network worms. Their simulation models avoid the problem of the
‘homogeneous mixing’ assumption but cannot provide an analytical study on the
propagation.
Thirdly, the spatial-temporal model in [24] captures accurate topological informa-
tion, and thus, can provide better modeling than previous epidemic models. However,
as discussed in Section 3.3.1, this model cannot present the temporal dynamics and
does not provide a strong approximation to spatial dependence.
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Finally, the work of [40] studies the eﬀect of topology on the spread of worms, but
their discussion is based on the SIS model. The work of [25] develops an SI model on
a speciﬁc social network formed by smart phones, which also has the problem of the
‘homogeneous mixing’ assumption.
There are also works which characterize the propagation dynamics of isomorphic
worms, such as P2P worms [18, 37, 83, 90] and mobile worms [103, 104]. The works
of [18,83,90] focus on ﬁnding the threshold conditions for the fast extinction of worms.
The work in [37] use a 0-1 matrix to model the propagation of P2P worms, but the
0-1 matrix is not suitable for use on social networks because the weight of any edge
should be a probability rather than a logic value (0 or 1). The authors in [103, 104]
explore the propagation dynamics of Bluetooth worms. Their models satisfy the
mobile property of nodes by assuming devices are homogeneously mixed, and thus,
are unlikely to work in real mobile social networks.
3.8 Conclusion of This Chapter
In this chapter, we propose a novel SII model for the propagation of social network
worms. This model is able to address two critical problems unsolved in previous
analytical models: temporal dynamics and spatial dependence. For the problem of
temporal dynamics, we introduce a spatial-temporal synchronization process. By
recording and accumulating each malicious message from neighbors in the last check-
ing time period, the infection probability of each user can be estimated by computing
joint probabilities of this user opening arrived messages. For the problem of spatial
dependence, we ﬁnd the essence of spatial dependence is the spreading cycles formed
in the propagation procedure. By removing the eﬀect of these spreading cycles, we
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are able to obtain a stronger approximation to the spatial dependence.
We conduct a number of experiments to evaluate the correctness of the SII model.
The experiments show the result of the SII model is close to the simulation, which
means our SII model is accurate for modeling the spread of social network worms.
We also compare the SII model with epidemic models, a spatial-temporal model, the
SIS model and the SIR model. The evaluation results indicate that our SII model is
more suitable for modeling the propagation of social network worms. We believe our
work presented in this chapter is of great signiﬁcance to academia and also of great
practical use.
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Chapter 4
Modeling the Propagation
Dynamics of Modern Email
Malware
4.1 Introduction
In the real world, email is a basic service for computer users, while email malware
poses a critical security threat. For a number of years, the propagation of email
malware has followed the same modus operandi. A viral email is sent to the victim
and appears as though it was sent by somebody the recipient trusts. The subject is
also related to the recipient’s area of business. Once the victim is tricked into either
clicking the malicious hyperlinks or opening the attachments inside such an email, the
computer will be compromised. Then, the compromised computer will immediately
start to infect new targets found in its email address lists. To prevent email malware,
scientists have spared no eﬀort to dissuade people from opening unexpected hyperlinks
and email attachments. However, the success of recent new email malware, such as
“Here you are” [38], indicates such education measures have not been very successful.
A key reason is because social engineering is a tried-and-true technique in the context
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of security. For example, by convincing computer users the received emails with
malicious hyperlinks and attachments are from a trusted source, the technique of
email-borne malware will be highly eﬀective and is still widely adopted by current
malware authors [100].
Current research on email malware [24, 42, 96, 102, 112] focuses on modeling the
propagation dynamics, which is a fundamental technique for developing counter-
measures to reduce email malware’s spreading speed and prevalence. There are a
few works that have reported to model email malware propagation. Previous work-
s [24, 42, 95, 96] assume a user can be infected and send malware copies only once ,
no matter whether or not the user visits a malicious hyperlink or attachment again.
Real instances are those early email malware like Melissa in 1999 [1] and Love letter
in 2000 [2], which checked whether a victim had been compromised before the infec-
tion. However, by introducing two new propagation features, modern email malware
is far more aggressive in spreading within a network than before [14,78,79,102]. The
ﬁrst feature is ‘reinfection’, i.e., an infected user sends out malware copies whenever
this user visits malicious hyperlinks or attachments. The second feature is ‘self-start’,
i.e., an infected user sends out malware copies when certain events (like PC restart)
are triggered. Researchers in [112] state that a user can be infected multiple times.
However, their model assumes an infected user can send only one malware copy each
time the user checks emails, even if the user visits more than one malicious hyperlink
or attachment. In short, the previous work [24,42,96,112] did not take these two new
features into account, and hence, cannot accurately estimate the propagation of mod-
ern email malware. An empirical study to support our argument will be introduced
later in Section 2.
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It is a big challenge to investigate modern email malware through mathematical
modeling. In fact, most email malware in the last decade, such as Sircam in 2001 [3],
Sobig in 2003 [4], Mydoom in 2004 [99], Nyxem in 2006 [63], “Here you are” in
2010 [38] and recent unnamed email malware [100] belongs to modern email malware.
The previous analytical model [24] presented the spreading procedure via an SIS
(Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible) process, but it did not consider the new features of
modern email malware. These observations become our motivation to develop a new
analytical model that can precisely present the propagation dynamics of modern email
malware. Since the spreading procedure can be characterized by an SII (Susceptible-
Infected-Immunized) process, we name our proposed model SII.
The major contributions of this chapter are listed below:
• We propose a new analytical model to capture the interactions among infected
email users using a set of diﬀerence equations. Together these will describe the
overall propagation of modern email malware.
• We introduce a new concept of virtual nodes to address the underestimation in
previous work. This can represent the situation of a user sending out one more
round of malware copies each time a user becomes infected.
• We perform an empirical and theoretical study to investigate why and how the
proposed SII model is superior to existing models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 states the problems
in modeling modern email malware. In Section 4.3, a new SII analytical model is
presented in detail. Section 4.4 reports a series of experiments to validate the proposed
model, followed by the theoretical justiﬁcation in Section 4.5. Further discussion and
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related work is presented in Section 4.6 and 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes this
chapter.
4.2 Problem Statement
Choosing email as the spreading carrier of malware is not a new technique. Early
versions of email malware, such as Melissa and Love letter, work in a “naive” way.
That is, a compromised user will send out malware emails only once, after which
the user will not send any further malware copies, even if she visits the malicious
hyperlinks or attachments again. If we use Melissa as an example, the malware ﬁrstly
checks a speciﬁc registry key in the Window OS, the value of this key suggests the
user has been infected before, the malware will do nothing further. In the following,
we name this spreading mechanism non-reinfection .
However, modern email malware is far more aggressive in spreading throughout
email networks than previously. Without checking if a computer has been infected
before, modern email malware makes use of every chance to spread itself. We charac-
terize its propagation with two new kinds of mechanisms, namely reinfection and
self-start .
4.2.1 Problem from a technical perspective
Reinfection, as the name suggests, indicates a user may become infected whenever
the user visits a malicious hyperlink or attachment. The reinfection outperforms the
nonreinfection in two aspects: 1) a user can be infected again even if the user has
been infected before; 2) a user will send out a malware copy every time the user is
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Figure 4.1: Recipient user j’s behavior for diﬀerent types of malware emails.
infected. Thus, a recipient may repeatedly receive malware emails from the same
compromised user.
We illustrate the reinfection process in Fig. 4.1. Suppose an email user i gets
infected and sends out malware email copies to another email user j. In case 1 of
the non-reinfection, although user i reads two malware emails at t8, the user will
become infected and send only one malware copy to user j at t8. The malware email
arrives at user j at t9. Then, when user j checks their mailbox at t13 and reads the
malware email from user i, user j gets infected. User j will not receive any more
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Table 4.1: The Number of Themes in Some Email Malware
Name Subject Message Attachment Hyperlink
Sircam random random random none
SoBig 13 2 13 none
Mydoom 19 8 26 none
Nyxem 23 8 36 none
NetSky 1 1 25 none
W32.Imsolk 2 7 none 12
The statistical results come from Symantec Security Response [5].
malware emails from user i after t9. Nevertheless, in case 3 of the reinfection, user
j will receive two malware copies from user i at t9. Furthermore, after user j gets
infected at t13, when user i reads another two malware emails, user j receives another
two malware copies from user i at t17. Compared with case 1 of the non-reinfection,
user j in case 3 of the reinfection receives a total of four malware emails.
Generally, it is common for malware emails to reuse themes but with slight vari-
ations on the body of the message and the attachment names. This trick increases
the possibility of a user becoming infected and particularly prompts the spreading
eﬃciency of the modern reinfection email malware. In Table 4.1, we list some types
of email malware with their number of themes. In this chapter, we assume every
malicious email has diﬀerent themes.
In fact, reinfection is also not enough to describe the propagation of modern
email malware [79]. In many cases, they modify registry entries in Windows OS and
the spreading process can be triggered whenever compromised computers restart or
certain ﬁles are opened by infected users. For example, Mydoom runs every time
Windows starts.
We also illustrate the outperformance of the self-start in Fig. 4.1, case 4. User
64
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
Time intervals (t)
Th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f i
nf
ec
te
d 
no
de
s 
in
 th
e 
ne
tw
or
k 
n(
t)
Nonreinfection
Reinfection [3]
Reinfection
Self−start
0 100 200 300 400
0
2
4
6
8
x 104
D
iff
er
en
ce
Δ
Figure 4.2: The propagation of email malware in an email network with 106 users.
The inset ﬁgure provides the diﬀerences (Δ) of various spreading mechanisms to the
non-reinfection mechanism.
i has been infected at t8. When the user restarts the computer at t20, a malware
email copy will be sent to user j in case 4 of the self-start. Compared with the non-
reinfection and the reinfection, user j receives a total of ﬁve malware emails. Thus,
this maneuver has promoted the spreading eﬃciency of modern email malware.
4.2.2 Problem from an empirical perspective
Currently, many models have been proposed to model the propagation of email mal-
ware. For example, the works of [24,42,96,102,112] present non-reinfection; the works
of [78,112] model reinfection and the work of [102] also discusses self-start. However,
previous models are not appropriate for modeling. We explain the reasons in two
questions below:
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Firstly , can we use models of non-reinfection to present the propagation dynamics
of modern email malware? Compared with the reinfection and self-start, modeling the
non-reinfection is simple. By using simulations [42,102,112] or analytical methods [24,
96], previous models have precisely presented the propagation dynamics of the non-
reinfection. However, as stated in [79,102], most real email malware is self-start email
malware. We simulate various spreading mechanisms and provide their diﬀerences (Δ)
to the non-reinfection in the inset ﬁgure of Fig.4.2. We can see self-start has a peak
diﬀerence of 4× 104 infected incidents. Thus, the self-start can spread much faster
than the non-reinfection and the previous non-reinfection models cannot be used to
present the propagation of modern email malware.
Secondly , can we use previous models of reinfection and self-start to describe
the propagation of modern email malware? The diﬀerential equation model adopted
in [78] has been proven by the earlier work of [112] to overestimate the spreading speed
by 20 percent. Because the work of [102] does not provide enough details in modeling
the reinfection and the self-start, we mainly refer to the work in [112]. The model is
illustrated in case 2 of Fig. 4.1 on the basis of their implementation [109]. We can see
that user i always sends only one malware copy to user j, even if the user is infected
by two malware emails at both t8 and t16. Compared with the reinfection discussed
in Section 4.2.1, user j receives a total of two malware emails in this instance. We
also present the numerical results from the simulations of the reinfection [112] in Fig.
4.2. We can see the reinfection presented in [112] has noticeable diﬀerences to
the self-start and reinfection discussed in Section 4.2.1. Thus, previous models of
the reinfection and self-start cannot be used in the propagation of modern email
malware.
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4.3 SII Model
In order to overcome the inaccuracy of previous models, we extend our previous SII
model [95] for modern email malware. The SII model is diﬀerent from SIS and SIR
models [10] because both susceptible and infected users can be immunized and never
become susceptible again.
4.3.1 Modeling nodes, topology and events of user
Nodes and topology information are the basic elements for the propagation of modern
email malware. A node in the topology represents a user in the email network. Let
random variable Xi(t) denote the state of a node i at discrete time t. Then, we have
Xi(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Hea., healthy
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Sus., susceptible
Imm., immunized
Inf., infected
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Act., active
Dor., dormant
(4.3.1)
The state transition graph of an arbitrary node i in an email network is shown in Fig.
4.3. All nodes in networks are initially susceptible. Since infected users will send out
malware copies when they are compromised, node i transits from the susceptible state
to the active state after the user of node i gets infected. The infection probability is
denoted by v(i, t). The user is infectious at the active state. When a user is infected
but not infectious, the node of this user transits to the dormant state. Besides, any
user can be compromised again even if the user has been infected before. We represent
the infection probabilities of an arbitrary node being at the dormant state and the
active state as g(i, t) and h(i, t) respectively. Whatever state an arbitrary node is at,
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Figure 4.3: State transition graph of a node in email topology.
it may transit to the immunized state. The probability of immunization is denoted
by r(t). In fact, if the values of g(i, t) and h(i, t) are equal to zero, any infected node
i will stay at the dormant state until the user of this node is immunized. In this
scenario, Fig. 4.3 will be simpliﬁed as the state transition representation of the non-
reinfection email malware. For the convenience of readers, we list major notations of
this chapter in Table 4.2.
In our SII model, we propose employing M by M square matrix with elements pij
to describe a topology consisting of M nodes, as in
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
p11 · · · p1M
... pij
...
pM1 · · · pMM
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ pij ∈ [0, 1] (4.3.2)
wherein pij represents the probability of user j visiting a deceptive malware email
received from user i. If pij is equal to zero, it means the email address of user j is not
in the contact list of user i. Therefore, the matrix reﬂects the topology of an email
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Table 4.2: Major Notations Used in This Chapter
Symbol Explanation
Ti Email checking time of user i.
Ri Event triggering period of user i.
r(t) The recovery function of users, which provides the probability
for any user to be immunized at time t.
Xi(t) The state of a network node i at time t: “Sus.” susceptible,
“Imm.” immunized, “Act.” active and “Dor.” dormant.
pij The probability of user j visiting malware emails from user i.
openi(t) The event of user i checking newly arrived emails at time t.
starti(t) The event of user i restarting computer at time t.
τ The arbitrary time between user i last checking
emails and the current time t (excluding t).
M The size of the Email network.
n(t) The number of infected nodes in the Email network at time t.
v(i, t) The infection probability of a susceptible node i at time t.
g(i, t) The infection probability of a dormant node i at time t.
h(i, t) The infection probability of an active node i at time t.
Ni The set of neighboring nodes of node i.
Ni|N The subset includes the real neighboring nodes of user i.
Ni|R The virtual nodes caused by visiting more than one malware.
Ni|S The virtual nodes caused by certain events triggered.
Hi The extended set of Ni (Hi = Ni|N +Ni|R +Ni|S).
Δ The numerical diﬀerences of various spreading mechanisms.
βji(t) The probability of user i being infected by user j at time t.
ζi(t) The average value of βji(t) for each j ∈ Hi.
network. In this chapter, we assume the states of neighboring nodes are independent.
This assumption has been adopted by previous models from [18,40,90,102]. In Section
4.6.3, we will analyze the impact of the independence assumption. Readers can refer
to the work of [24, 105] for more information about this assumption.
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4.3.2 Modeling propagation dynamics
Similar to the discussion in Section 3.3.1, we use s(i, t) to represent the probability
of user i visiting malware emails from neighboring nodes. The infection probability
v(i, t) can then be derived as in
v(i, t) = s(i, t) · P (openi(t) = 1) · [1− r(t)] (4.3.3)
In our SII model, an arbitrary user i visits malicious hyperlinks or attachments with
probability pji when reading malware emails from a neighboring user j. Similar to
equation (3.4.14), we have
s(i, t) = 1−{1− s(i, t− 1) · [1−P (openi(t− 1) = 1)]} ·
∏
j∈Ni
(
1− pji ·P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
(4.3.4)
In equation (4.3.3), diﬀerent measures of P (Xj(t − 1) = Act.) and Ni may lead to
diﬀerent spreading performance.
4.3.3 Virtual nodes
For modern email malware, a compromised user may send out malware email copies
to neighbors every time the user visits those malware hyperlinks or attachments.
Malware emails are also sent when certain events like computer restart are triggered.
Thus, at an arbitrary time t, a user may receive multiple malware email copies from
an identical neighboring user who has been compromised. In order to represent the
repetitious spreading process of the reinfection and the self-start, we introduce virtual
nodes to present the kth infection caused by infected users opening the kth malware
email copy.
As shown in Fig. 4.4, nodes 1, 2 and 3 send malware emails to node 4. When
the user of node 4 visits those emails, the user becomes infected. If the user of node
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Figure 4.4: An example to explain virtual nodes in the reinfection case and the self-
start case. Nodes 1, 2 and 3 send a malware copy to node 4.
4 visits two malware emails, node 4 will send malware email copies twice to node
6. If the user of node 4 visits three malware emails, node 4 will send treble the
malware email copies to node 6. The spreading process of extra malware email copies
is equivalent to two virtual nodes sending a malware copy to node 6. We introduce
virtual node 7 to denote the possible spreading if user 4 visits the second malware
email. We also use virtual node 8 to denote the possible spreading if user 4 visits
the third malware email. Moreover, when the user of infected node 5 restarts their
computer or some speciﬁc events are triggered, this user will also send out a malware
email copy to the user of node 6. This is also equivalent to a virtual node sending
a malware copy to node 6. We introduce virtual node 9 to denote this process.
In order to represent the spreading process of virtual nodes, we extend Ni into a
new set of neighboring nodes, Hi, which contains three subsets: Ni|N , Ni|R and Ni|S.
Then, we revise the equation (4.3.4) for modeling the propagation of modern email
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malware as in
s(i, t) =1− {1− s(i, t− 1) · [1− P (openi(t− 1) = 1)]}·∏
j∈Ni|N
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
·
∏
j∈Ni|S
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
·
∏
j∈Ni|R
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
(4.3.5)
Firstly , the subset Ni|N includes the real neighboring nodes of user i (e.g.,
N6|N=node 4, node 5). In fact, the nodes in Ni|N represent the neighboring users who
visit the ﬁrst malware email copy and become infected. Since the states of neighbor-
ing nodes are independent, each node is infected by neighboring nodes regardless of
the state of this node [24]. Thus, we simply consider v(i, t) = g(i, t) = h(i, t) (See
Section 4.6.3 for discussion). Then, the value of P (Xj(t − 1) = Act.) for user j in
Ni|N can be derived as
P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.) = v(j, t− 1) · P (Xj(t− 2) = Sus.) + g(j, t− 1) · P (Xj(t− 2) = Dor.)+
h(j, t− 1) · P (Xj(t− 2) = Act.)
= v(j, t− 1) · [1− P (Xj(t− 2) = Imm.)]
(4.3.6)
Secondly , the subset Ni|S includes the virtual nodes which present the extra spread-
ing processes caused by certain events triggered in infected nodes (i.e., N6|S=node
9). In this case, we introduce another ﬂag variable starti(t). We have starti(t) = 1
if the events happen at time t, otherwise starti(t) = 0. Assuming the events are
periodically triggered and Ri is the event triggering period of user i, we have
P (starti(t) = 1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, otherwise
1, t mod Ri = 0
(4.3.7)
Then, we can compute the value of P (Xj(t − 1) = Act.) for user j who belongs to
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Ni|S as in
P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.) = P (startj(t− 1) = 1) · P (Xj(t− 1) = Inf.) (4.3.8)
Thirdly , the subset Ni|R includes the virtual nodes which present the extra
spreading processes caused by users visiting more than one malware copy when they
check new emails (i.e. N6|R=node 7, node 8). In fact, this is a permutation problem.
For example, node 7 in Fig. 6 presents the spreading process caused by user 4 visit-
ing the second malware email. Thus, the value of P (X7(t− 1) = Act.) indicates the
probability of user 4 visiting any two or three malware emails from user 1, 2 or 3. We
use βji(t) to present the probability of user i being infected by user j at time t and
βji(t) to indicate the negation of βji(t) as in
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
βji(t) = pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.) · P (openi(t) = 1)
βji(t) = 1− pji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.) · P (openi(t) = 1)
(4.3.9)
We then derive the value of P (X7(t− 1) = Act.) as in
P (X7(t− 1) = Act.) =β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1) + β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)+
β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1) + β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)
=P (X4(t− 1) = Act.)− β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)−
β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)− β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)
(4.3.10)
Node 8 in Fig. 4.4 presents the spreading process caused by user 4 visiting the third
malware email. Similarly, we compute the value of P (X8(t− 1) = Act.) as in
P (X8(t− 1) = Act.) = β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)
=P (X7(t− 1) = Act.)− β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)−
β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)− β14(t− 1)β24(t− 1)β34(t− 1)
(4.3.11)
If a user is popular, the node of this user may have many neighbors. For popular
users, the permutation problem may become very complex. For example, we assume
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an arbitrary node i has m neighbors. To compute the probability of user i opening
the second malware email from those m neighbors, we have to run C2m combinations
of the multiplication of βji(t). If the user of each node opens at most k emails,
the computation for each run on each node is a total of
∑k=d
k=1 C
k
m. Noticeably, it
is computationally too expensive to obtain the result. Thus, we introduce Bernoulli
approximation. The Bernoulli experiment is widely used to model the number of
successes in a sample drawn from a large population. We can see that virtual nodes
provide us with a series of easily derived equations that can then be used to compute
the probabilities of multiple infections using the Bernoulli approximation. This helps
us solve the combination problem. We use ζi(t) to denote the average value of βji(t)
for each neighboring node j (j ∈ Hi, Hi = Ni|N +Ni|R +Ni|S). Then, we have
ζi(t) =
1
‖ Hi ‖
∑
j∈Hi
βji(t) (4.3.12)
Moreover, we use k to denote the order of the malware emails that user j visits, such
as k = 2 when the user visits the second malware email and k = 3 when user j visits
the third one. We have the value of P (Xj k(t− 1) = Act.) for user j who belongs to
Ni|R as in
P (Xj 1(t− 1) = Act.) = P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.) (k = 1) (4.3.13)
P (Xj k(t− 1) = Act.) = P (Xj (k−1)(t− 1) = Act.)−
( k∏
j=1
βji(t)
‖Hi‖∏
j=k+1
βji(t) + · · ·+
‖Hi‖−k∏
j=1
βji(t)
‖Hi‖∏
j=‖Hi‖−k+1
βji(t)
)
≈P (Xj (k−1)(t− 1) = Act.)− Ck‖Hi‖[ζi(t)]k[1− ζi(t)]‖Hi‖−k (k ≥ 2)
(4.3.14)
In fact, the value of k also reﬂects the vigilance of email users for opening malicious
hyperlinks or malware attachments. If the email malware becomes more deceptive,
the value of k becomes larger. We will carry out extensive discussion about k in
Section 4.6.2.
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4.4 Model Evaluation
4.4.1 Experiment environment
In this ﬁeld, all existing research uses simulation to evaluate analytical models, such
as [24, 96]. We follow this approach to evaluate the proposed SII model based on
simulations. In real-world scenarios, the spread of most email malware is typical-
ly impossible to track given the directed, topological manner in which they spread.
When email malware, such as Nyxem [63], compromises a computer, it will automati-
cally generate a single http request for the URL of an online statistics page. However,
as the report [63] also said, the statistics of Nyxem cannot present a precise investi-
gation on the spread of email malware due to legitimate access, repeated probes and
DDoS attacks on the web page. In addition, it should be pointed out there is no real
dataset available for the evaluation of models regarding modern email malware.
Email topology is a key component of simulation. Some existing work, such as [10,
24,112] shows topological factors have a strong impact on the speed and scale of the
malware propagation. In this chapter, we build the topology according to the previous
analysis of real email networks [32, 70], which exhibit “semi-directed”, scale-free and
small-world properties. The topology has 100,000 nodes. We reproduce the degree for
each node using the Power-law distribution [12]. Moreover, the probability of users
being infected by their friends (pij), the email checking period (Ti) and the event
triggering period (Ri) is mainly decided by humans. Similar to [109], these parameters
will follow the Gaussian distribution. Note that the Gaussian distribution generator
may provide unrealistic values, such as pij < 0 and Ti < 1. In our experiment, we
replace these values with the minimums of their realistic range. Thus, if pij < 0,
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Figure 4.5: The comparison between SII model and previous models. pij ∼
N(0.5, 0.22), α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5, k = 5. Δ denotes the diﬀerences between the
results of the SII model, previous models and the simulations.
Ti < 1 and Ri < 1, we let pij = 0, Ti = 1 and Ri = 1.
We draw an SII-compatible propagation simulator from existing simulation models
[36,42,103,112]. The implementation is in C++ and Matlab 7. The random numbers
in the experiments are produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions. We run each
simulation 100 times for an average result. The number 100 comes from the discussion
“how many simulation runs are needed before we obtain a steady curve? [112].” Each
run of the spread begins with two infected nodes, which are randomly chosen from
the topology. These two nodes keep a topology distance of 6 (the number of edges
between them) so a certain clustering coeﬃcient [32] is implicitly implemented. For
the convenience of readers, we have put the source codes of the SII model and the
simulator online [97].
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4.4.2 Comparison with previous models
To evaluate the accuracy of our model, we conduct experiments with diﬀerent param-
eter settings. Most values in the settings come from the previous work of [32,70,112].
We compare our SII model with previous models from [24, 42, 96, 112]. The work
in [112] presents the modeling of the reinfection without virtual nodes. The models
in [24, 42, 96] present the propagation of the non-reinfection. In this experiment, the
topology has the following properties: the power-law exponent α = 2.5, the average
degree E(D) = 5.5 and the values of pij follow Gaussian distribution N(0.5, 0.2
2).
In order to exclude the impact of the recovery processes, the experiment is carried
out with r(t) = 0. We let Ti and Ri follow Gaussian distribution N(40, 20
2). The
vigilance k of the email users is set to 5. As shown in Fig. 4.5, our SII model was
far more accurate than previous models. We exhibit the diﬀerences Δ in the inset
of Fig. 4.5. We can see the results of previous models deviate from simulations by
80 thousands less infections at maximum. There is also a minor divergence between
the results of the SII model and simulations. As explained in [24], this diﬀerence is
caused by the independent assumption. We have presented an extensive discussion
on the impact of this assumption in Section 4.6.3.
4.4.3 Impact of parameters in modeling
We also evaluate the impact of various parameters on the accuracy of the modeling.
Firstly, we evaluate the accuracy with diﬀerent distributions of Ti and Ri. In
this experiment, the topology has the same settings as in Fig. 4.5. As shown in Fig.
4.6, the curves of our SII model are close to the simulations even if the distributions
of Ti and Ri are diﬀerent.
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Figure 4.6: The accuracy with diﬀerent distributions of Ti and Ri. pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22),
α = 2.5, E(D) = 5.5. Δ denotes the diﬀerences between the results of our SII model
and the simulations.
Secondly, we also evaluate the accuracy with diﬀerent distributions of pij. The
same topologies are used in this experiment. We let Ti and Ri follow Gaussian
distribution N(40, 202). As shown in Fig. 4.7, the results of our SII model were close
to the results of simulations. In the inset ﬁgure of Fig. 4.7, we can also see the SII
model achieves better performance in accuracy when the infection probabilities pij
are on average higher. For the same reason of the independent assumption, we can
achieve better accuracy once we relax this assumption in future modeling.
Thirdly, we evaluate the accuracy in diﬀerent topologies. In this experiment, we
let Ti and Ri follow Gaussian distribution N(40, 20
2) and the infection probability
pij follows N(0.5, 0.2
2). As shown in Fig. 4.8, our SII model was eﬀective in various
topologies with diﬀerent power-law exponents α and means of degrees E(D).
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Finally, we evaluate the accuracy with recovery functions r(t). We consider two
recovery functions: 1) constant recovery rate ρ (r(t) = ρ); 2) Qualys rate. According
to the statistics of Qualys Inc. [33], after detection, the number of susceptible and
infected users decreases by 50 percent of the remaining every 30 days in 2003 and 21
days in 2004. We use a variable d1 to denote the temporal span from the malware
starting to spread to scientists ﬁnding this malware on the Internet. During the
temporal period d1, modern email malware can spread freely on the Internet (r(t) =
0). We introduce another variable d2 to denote the temporal span of a 50 percent
decrease. Then, we have the Qualys rate of the recovery functions as in
r(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, t < d1
1− 0.5 t−d1d2 , t ≥ d1
(4.4.1)
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In this experiment, the topology has the following properties: the power-law expo-
nent α = 2.5, and the average degree E(D) = 5.5. The values of pij follow Gaussian
distribution N(0.5, 0.22). The values of Ti and Ri follow N(40, 20
2). We can see in
Fig. 4.9 that our SII model is accurate compared with the simulations. This means
the SII model is suitable for the propagation modeling of modern email malware.
4.5 Theoretical Justiﬁcation
The empirical study has shown our SII model is superior to previous models [24,
42, 96, 112]. We further provide theoretical justiﬁcation for modeling the spreading
mechanism and the state transition of the propagation.
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4.5.1 Superiority in spreading mechanisms
Modern email malware has two aggressive spreading mechanisms. The ﬁrst one is
caused by reinfection where any user can be infected again even if this node has been
infected before. The second one is the repetitious spreading process caused by the
reinfection and the self-start, where any infected user spreads malware email copies
every time the user visits malware emails or the infected computer restarts.
We can present previous models from [24,42,96] by setting the probabilities g(i, t)
and h(i, t) to be zero. Considering the number of infected nodes n(t), we have n(t) ∝
P (Xj(t) = Act.) for ∀j ∈ Ni, i ∈ [1,M ] in Section 4.3. We use ω1 and ω2 to denote
P (Xi(t) = Act.) for previous models [24,42,96] and the SII model respectively. Then,
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we have
ω1 = v(i, t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) (4.5.1)
ω2 = v(i, t) · [1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Imm.)] (4.5.2)
Obviously, we have
ω2 − ω1 = v(i, t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.) > 0 (4.5.3)
Given an email network and a spreading case of modern email malware on the network,
we investigate the divergence of n(t) caused by ω2 − ω1 > 0. In order to eliminate
the impact of the second mechanism, we set Ni|R, Ni|S = Φ. As shown in Fig. 4.10,
we can see the divergence caused by modeling the ﬁrst spreading mechanism when it
reaches more than 20 thousand.
In order to present the repetitious spreading processes, we extend the set of neigh-
boring users by virtual nodes. Note that we have Hi > Ni. In model [112], no matter
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how many malware emails an infected user visits, only one malware email copy will
be sent out. Thus, we have Ni|R, Ni|S = Φ and Hi = Ni for the model [112]. We use
ω3, ω4 and ω5 to denote the impact of modeling the spreading in [112], the reinfection
process and the self-start process as in
ω3 =
∏
j∈Ni|N
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
(4.5.4)
ω4 =
∏
j∈Ni|R
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
(4.5.5)
ω5 =
∏
j∈Ni|S
(
1− pji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
)
(4.5.6)
Then, we can have
ω3 > ω3 × ω4 > ω3 × ω4 × ω5 (4.5.7)
Nodes in the network are easier to be infected and become infectious if they have larger
neighboring sets. We investigate the divergence of n(t) caused by the inequality (4.5.7)
in modeling the reinfection. As shown in Fig. 4.10, we can see the maximal divergence
of modeling the second mechanism reaches 35,000. Particularly, by modeling the self-
start, the divergence reaches 95,000.
On the basis of the above analysis, we can see our SII model is able to present
the propagation of modern email malware. The divergence between n(t) and its
estimation is large in previous models [24,42,96,112]. Thus, previous models cannot
be used in modeling the propagation of modern email malware.
4.5.2 Superiority in modeling state transitions
We compare our SII model with SIS models [18, 24, 40, 75, 83, 90] and SIR models
[10, 64]. The diﬀerence among these models is caused by diﬀerent considerations on
the state transition of nodes. SIS models assume infected nodes become susceptible
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Figure 4.11: The diﬀerence of SII, SIR and SIS models. pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22), Ti ∼
N(40, 202), Ri ∼ N(40, 202), Qualys recovery function: d1 = 80, d2 = 40.
again after recovery. If infected nodes cannot become susceptible once they are cured,
the models are called SIR models. Considering the propagation of modern email
malware, after users clean their infected computers or become more vigilant against
a type of malware, they are unlikely to become infected again. Therefore, SIS models
are not appropriate to model the propagation of modern email malware. SIR models
may suit for modern email malware, but the real case is whether a susceptible user
can be immunized directly without being infected ﬁrst. Thus, the state transition of
our SII model is similar to the SIR model except nodes at the susceptible state can
directly transit to the immunized state.
In order to exclude the impact of other factors, we derive the SIS and SIR models
on the basis of the SII model. Firstly, a susceptible user can be immunized in a SII
model, but not in a SIR model. Thus, we can revise equation 4.3.6 to obtain an SIR
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model as in
P (Xi(t) = Imm.) = P (Xi(t− 1) = Imm.) + r(t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.) (4.5.8)
Secondly, an SIS model does not have the immunized state. We can have it by setting
P (Xi(t) = Imm.) = 0 and revising equation 4.3.5 as in
P (Xi(t) = Sus.) = (1− v(t)) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) + r(t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.) (4.5.9)
As shown in Fig. 4.11, the results of the SII model decrease more rapidly than SIR
and SIS models. Thus, we cannot use traditional SIS and SIR models to model the
propagation of modern email malware.
4.6 Further Discussion and Limitations
In this section, we will discuss the limitations of our proposed model. The experi-
ments adopt typical settings: pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22), Ti ∼ N(40, 202), Ri ∼ N(40, 202).
Moreover, the recovery functions will not be considered in this section (r(t) = 0).
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4.6.1 Test of Bernoulli approximation
It is computationally too expensive to calculate the real value of the probability of
virtual nodes being infectious, particularly when the number of virtual nodes is large.
Thus, we use the average value ζi(t) to substitute each βji(t) (j ∈ Hi) and apply the
Bernoulli approximation on this probability. In this section, we adopt the variance of
βji(t), vari(t), to investigate the accuracy of the Bernoulli approximation, as in
vari(t) =
‖Hi‖∑
j=1
[βji(t)− ζi(t)]2/‖Hi‖ (4.6.1)
When the values of vari(t) are small, the values of βji(t) are close to the average value
ζi(t), which means the Bernoulli approximation is accurate.
In our experiment, we examine the node which has maximal degree because it has
a large number of virtual nodes in the modeling. As shown in Fig. 4.12, it turns out
the values of the variance vari(t) are rather small, on the order of 10
−3. Thus, we
can approximate values of βji(t) using the average value ζi(t).
4.6.2 The eﬀect of users’ vigilance (the value k)
Modern email malware infects unwary users when they open malicious email attach-
ments or visit infectious hyperlinks in the email content. The vigilance of users
determines the number of malicious emails that are opened by the users. The higher
a user’s vigilance is, the less malware emails opened. As discussed in this chapter,
the vigilance of users determines the number of virtual nodes for each user in the
modeling, which greatly aﬀects the spreading speed and scale. In this subsection, we
analyze and quantify the eﬀect of users’ vigilance (the value k).
The value k presents the maximal number of malware emails that each user may
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Figure 4.13: The eﬀect of users’ vigilance. pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22), Ti ∼ N(40, 202),
Ri ∼ N(40, 202). Δ denotes the diﬀerences with varied values of k.
Table 4.3: KL divergence in the independent assumption
a=Act., b=Sus. a=Act., b=Act. a=Act., b=Dor.
DKL 5.2390 0.0432 0.0446
visit. We run the SII model from k = 1 to k = 5 in the self-start case. As shown in
Fig. 4.13, the diﬀerences of n(t) are large with varied values of k. For example, at
time tick 100, the diﬀerence reaches about 10,000 for each increment in the value of
k. Besides, we statistically investigate the number of virtual nodes the method will
add in computing the model’s numerical results. We use vn(t) to denote the number
of virtual nodes at each time t. As shown in Fig. 4.14, larger values of k leads to
an increment in the values of vn(t). In practical terms, both the experiments suggest
that lower vigilance of real-world users may speed up the outbreak of modern email
malware on the Internet.
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Figure 4.14: The number of virtual nodes vn(t) for diﬀerent k. pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22),
Ti ∼ N(40, 202), Ri ∼ N(40, 202).
4.6.3 The independent assumption
We can see from Fig. 4.3 the values v(j, t), g(j, t) and h(j, t) denote the conditional
probabilities as in
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
v(j, t) = P (Xj(t) = Act. | Xj(t− 1) = Sus.)
g(j, t) = P (Xj(t) = Act. | Xj(t− 1) = Dor.)
h(j, t) = P (Xj(t) = Act. | Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
(4.6.2)
Take v(j, t) for example, we derive the equation as in
v(j, t) = P (openj(t) = 1) · [1− r(t)] ·
{
1−
∏
i∈Nj
(
1− pij · P (Xi(t− 1) = Act. | Xj(t− 1) = Sus.)
)} (4.6.3)
However, in the above modeling, we assume the states of nodes are independent of
each other. The infection of a node only depends on its neighboring nodes regardless
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Figure 4.15: The errors diff(a, b) for the independent assumption. pij ∼ N(0.5, 0.22),
Ti ∼ N(40, 202), Ri ∼ N(40, 202).
of the state of this node. Thus, we can derive the following approximation as in
v(j, t) = g(j, t) = h(j, t) = P (openj(t) = 1)·[1−r(t)]·
{
1−
∏
i∈Nj
(
1−pij ·P (Xi(τ) = Act.)
)}
(4.6.4)
We can see the essence of the independent assumption is using marginal probabil-
ity P (Xi(t − 1) = Act.) to substitute the conditional probabilities P (Xi(t − 1) =
Act.|Xj(t − 1) = Sus.), P (Xi(t − 1) = Act.|Xj(t − 1) = Act.) and P (Xi(t − 1) =
Act.|Xj(t − 1) = Dor.). As stated in [24], this approximation may cause the inac-
curate estimation in the modeling. In Section 4.4.2, we saw the analytical results
deviate from the simulations.
In order to show how many errors will be caused by the independent approxima-
tion, we introduce a variable diff(a, b) to denote the diﬀerence between the marginal
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and the conditional probabilities as in
diff(a, b) = P (Xi(t− 1) = a)− P (Xi(t− 1) = a | Xj(t− 1) = b)
= P (Xi(t− 1) = a)− P (Xi(t− 1) = a,Xj(t− 1) = b)
P (Xj(t− 1) = b)
(4.6.5)
whereas a = Act.,b ∈ {Act., Sus.,Dor.}. The node with a larger degree is more
easily aﬀected by the independent assumption. Thus, we examine diff(a, b) on a
pair of neighboring nodes, one of which has maximal degree in the network. The
probabilities are averaged by the simulation of 1000 individual runs. As shown in
Fig. 4.15, diff(a, b) is not equal to zero. Thus, the independent approximation may
cause errors in the modeling. In addition, we examine the symmetric Kullback-Leibler
divergence, DKL, between the marginal and conditional probabilities. We can see in
Table 4.3 that the result of DKL (b=‘Sus.’) is much larger than the results when
b=‘Act.’ or ‘Dor.’. This means the case of using P (Xi(t − 1) = Act.) instead of
P (Xi(t− 1) = Act.|Xj(t− 1) = Sus.) will cause larger errors than another two cases.
In fact, the conditional probabilities are too expensive to obtain mathematically.
Thus, most analytical models and analysis, such as [18, 40, 90, 102] assume nodes are
independent of each other. In this chapter, we follow the independent assumption,
and mainly focus on presenting reinfection and self-start in the modeling. We plan
to investigate how to relax the independent assumption in modeling reinfection and
self-start in the future. Readers might refer to [24, 105] for possible solutions.
4.6.4 The periodical assumption on Ti and Ri
A premise of the above modeling is that a user checks newly arrived emails, and
certain events, such as the restart of computers, are triggered at regular periods (Ti
and Ri). However, in real-world situations, users may check new emails and trigger
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certain events at any time. Indeed, some people may check emails at 7 o’clock in the
morning but not again until 17 o’clock in the afternoon of the next day. Nevertheless,
most people may follow a long-term period of email checking time denoted by Ti. We
can also assume a long-term period of Ri. The values of Ti and Ri depend only on
the patterns of users. In the analytical modeling, it is reasonable to adopt long-term
regular periods of Ti and Ri instead of varied checking time values and triggering time
values for each user.
We plan to incorporate irregular checking time into our analytical SII model in
the future. A possible solution is to assign new values of Ti for each user after the
user checks new emails at current time t. The same operation can also be applied to
the value of Ri. Then, our SII model could possibly be compatible with varied Ti and
Ri for each user.
4.6.5 Discussion of modeling repetitious infections
In this chapter, we introduce virtual nodes in order to address the modeling of re-
infection and self-start. Readers could also think of dividing the infected state into
several sub-infected states. The kth sub-infected state indicates a user having received
k email malware copies (0 < n < ||Hi||). However, this method is too computational-
ly expensive as the infection probability will be calculated by
∑k=d
k=1 C
k
m combinations
(m = Ni). Moreover, the sub-infected states are diﬃcult to implement when ||Hi||
is large. On the contrary, the virtual node, which indicates a user opening the kth
malware email copy, can be easily derived and approximated. Currently, this is still
on-going in our research. We plan to simplify modeling multiple infections in the
future.
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4.7 Related Work for This Chapter
In the last decade, there has been substantial eﬀort in modeling the propagation
dynamics of Internet malware during the previous. Firstly , to model the epidemic
spreading on topological networks, early researchers adopt diﬀerential equations to
present the propagation dynamics of malware. However, as discussed in [112], the
diﬀerential models of [10, 64, 75] greatly overestimate the spreading speed due to the
‘homogeneous mixing’ assumption. Additionally, C.C. Zou et al. [112] and C. Gao
et al. [42] rely on simulations to model the spread of email malware. Their simula-
tion models avoid the ‘homogeneous mixing’ problem but cannot provide analytical
propagation studies. The works of [18,24,90,95] propose mathematical models, which
have captured accurate topological information. S. Wen et al. [95] further addressed
temporal dynamics and the spatial dependence problem in propagation modeling.
However, all of these models cannot present the reinfection and self-start processes
of modern email malware. The works of [18, 40, 90] focus on threshold conditions for
the fast extinction of malware on the Internet. Their works study the ﬁnal stable
state of the epidemic spread based on SIS models, whereas we study the transient
propagation dynamics of modern email malware.
Secondly, there are some works which characterize propagation dynamics of iso-
morphic malware, such as P2P malware [83], mobile malware [25, 104] and malware
on online social networks [36,103]. R. Thommes and M. Coates [83] adopt diﬀerential
equations to present the propagation of P2P malware through a P2P network. The
models of [25,104] are proposed for the mobile environment by presuming nodes meet
each other with a probability. These works assume all individual devices are homo-
geneously mixed, and thus, are unlikely to work in the real mobile environment. The
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models of [36, 103] present the propagation of online social malware by simulations.
Since the models of [25, 36, 83, 103,104] are based on non-reinfection, they cannot be
adopted to present the propagation of modern email malware.
4.8 Conclusion of This Chapter
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel SII model for the propagation of modern
email malware. This model is able to address two critical processes unsolved in pre-
vious models: the reinfection and the self-start. By introducing a group of diﬀerence
equations and virtual nodes, we presented the repetitious spreading processes caused
by reinfection and self-start. The experiments showed the result of our SII model is
close to the simulations. For future work, there are some problems that need to be
solved, such as the independent assumption between users in the network and the
periodic assumption of checking the email time of users.
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Chapter 5
Modeling the Propagation of
Conﬂicted Information in Online
Social Networks
5.1 Introduction
The popularity of online social networks (OSN), such as Facebook [84], Google
Plus [45] and Twitter [53], has greatly increased in recent years. OSNs have be-
come an important platform for the dissemination of news, ideas and opinions, etc.
Unfortunately, OSN is a double-edged sword. The openness of OSN platforms al-
so enables rumors, gossip and other forms of disinformation to spread all over the
Internet. Simply, we name authentic information as the positive information and
conﬂicting fake news (e.g., rumors) as the negative information.
5.1.1 How Information Spreads in OSNs
Both positive and negative information can spread in OSNs by posting on walls or
directly sending messages to social neighbors. The propagation process continues
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when neighboring users believe the information and forward it to their social neigh-
bors. When a user receives contradicting pieces of information (i.e., both positive
and negative), he or she makes a choice. The user might choose the positive or neg-
ative, or even reject both. In the following, we list three real cases according to our
investigation on the history of OSNs:
1) “Two explosions in White House and Barack Obama is injured (April 23,
2013)”: Syrian hackers broke into the twitter account of Associated Press (AP) and
spread news that explosions at the White House injured Obama [77]. The White
House and AP assured the public minutes later the report was not true but word did
not come quick enough to those frantically watching and responding on Wall Street.
Both the DOW Jones industrial average and Standard & Poor’s 500 Index plunged
about 1 percent before regaining their losses.
People might have been misled by critical rumors they received, but once the
White House (the positive information source) clariﬁed the rumor to the public, they
deﬁnitely believed the White House regardless of the rumor. In this case, we say
people made optimistic choices based upon the information they received. On the
contrary, people can also make pessimistic choices if they absolutely believe negative
information.
Technically, if OSN users receive both kinds of information and make optimistic
choices, they will believe the positive information regardless of the negative informa-
tion. Given the probabilities of people believing positive information (a) and negative
information (b), we have 0 < a < 1, b = 0. We let a+ b < 1 since they can contradict
both kinds of information like “there was an explosion in White House but Obama
was not injured”. Similarly, we have a = 0, 0 < b < 1, a + b < 1 for people making
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pessimistic choices.
2) “Coup d’etat in Tunisia (January 11, 2011)”: the Arab world has experienced a
series of revolutions and power changes over the last few years. It started in Tunisia,
and OSNs like Facebook and Twitter also played an important role. For example, a
rumor from tweeters went round that the army seized power and ousted the Tunisian
president. The rumor was swiftly ‘retweeted’ by people but the coup story was later
suggested to be untrue by Egyptian Chronicles since there had been no conﬁrmation
from the government [107].
People preferred to believe the wrong news with the expectation this rumor was
true [48]. They were happy if their president was out of power. In this case, we say
people made preferable choices on both kinds of competitive information.
Technically, people make choices according to their preference. If people prefer
positive information, we have 0 < b < a < 1, a + b < 1. On the contrary, if people
prefer negative information, we have 0 < a < b < 1, a+ b < 1.
3) “R.I.P Jackie Chan Dead (June 19 2013)”: Most recently, the action star
Jackie Chan was reported to be dead, with Facebook sending thousands of his devout
fans into shock. The rumor spread even though some said he was still alive. The
hoax ﬁnally ended when Jackie Chan posted a photo of himself with a newspaper on
Facebook [15]. In this case, we say people made alternative choices before Jackie
Chan himself dispelled the hoax.
Technically, people making alternative choices is people answering “Yes-or-No”
questions. People must take one side. They cannot say Jackie Chan is neither dead
nor alive. If people believe Jackie Chan has died (negative news) with probability a,
there must be a probability b that people believe he still alive (positive news), and
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therefore we have 0 < a, b < 1, a+b = 1. This is diﬀerent from the previous two cases
where people may have possibly contradicted both kinds of information.
5.1.2 Motivation
A realistic propagation model for social networks should take both the social and the
digital aspects of this media into account. For example, when a rumor is heard, some
may believe it but some may not. In addition, due to behavioral diﬀerences, some
may keep silent, while others may actively contribute to spreading the rumor. Also,
there are certain delays in checking new digital messages and forwarding them, which
is a speciﬁc issue of OSNs.
In previous work, the independent cascade model (ICM) [9,13,20,21,26,49,52,82]
and the linear threshold model (LTM) [11, 26, 46, 49] are two primary models for the
propagation of both positive and negative information in OSNs. ICM is basically
a simulation model. LTM provides a deterministic spread process but each node
in LTM is either absolutely ‘active’ or ‘inactive’. Thus, LTM is also closer to a
simulation model rather than an analytical model. In simulation, it is possible to ﬁnd
the probability of being in a state by averaging over many runs, but this does not
express the reasons why an initial set of parameters ends in such results. Moreover,
people in ICM and LTM are limited to two basic states of believing either positive
or negative information. This is far from being enough to represent social behavioral
diﬀerences to which we have referred before. Additionally, the ICM and LTM family
of models do not take temporal dynamics into account. These include the frequency
people check social news and the time they take to forward the information. Thus,
their results may largely deviate from the real spreading dynamics in OSNs.
97
There are other models that discuss the propagation of single-type information [25,
34,41,51,86,104,105]. However, such works are incapable of capturing the phenomena
happening in the presence of contradictory information. This is because the model
needs to present the process of people making choices if they receive both kinds of
information.
In fact, propagation studies, such as modeling and parameter analysis, are funda-
mental to the research in this ﬁeld. It is mandatory to provide an accurate analytical
model before we convincingly investigate the way to control the spread of both posi-
tive and negative information. As far as we are aware, the work in this chapter is the
ﬁrst to propose an analytical model and analysis discussing the propagation of both
positive and negative information in OSNs.
5.1.3 Contributions
The primary contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We propose an analytical model on the propagation of positive and negative
information. This model presents both the propagation dynamics and the be-
haviors of people making choices when they receive both kinds of information.
• We carried out a series of experiments to evaluate the accuracy of our proposed
model. The experiments were based on two real OSNs: Facebook and Google
Plus. The results showed that our proposed analytical model is quite accurate
compared with simulations.
• On the basis of the analytical model, we further study the parameter impacts
on the spreading dynamics. This part of the analysis well supports the tactic
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of restraining negative information by spreading positive information.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the skele-
ton of the analytical model. In Section 5.3, we explain and model the processes of
people making choices when they receive both kinds of information. Section 5.4 is
the accuracy evaluation followed by comparisons with previous models in Section 5.5.
We present the studies of parameter impacts in Section 5.6. Related works and the
conclusion will be presented in Section 5.7 and 5.8, respectively.
5.2 Propagation Modeling Primer
5.2.1 Modeling Nodes, Topology and Social Events
Nodes and topology properties are basic elements for the propagation of OSN infor-
mation. Given an OSN, we derive the topology of it. A node in the topology denotes
a user in the OSN. In the real world, people may believe positive information, neg-
ative information or have not heard of the information yet. Let random variable
Xi(t) represent the state of node i at discrete time t. We borrow the concepts from
epidemics and derive the values of Xi(t) as follows
Xi(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Sus., susceptible
Rec., recovered
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Ins., insider
Act., active
Imm., immunized
Inf., infected
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mis., misled
Con., contagious
Dor., dormant
(5.2.1)
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Every user is initially susceptible (Xi(0) = Sus.). During the spread, user i believes
the positive information if Xi(t) = Rec. and the negative information if Xi(t) =
Inf. We will further explain the child states {Ins.,Mis., Act., Con., Imm.,Dor.} in
Section 5.3. We have introduced more states to the model compared with previous
works [24, 97].
Secondly, we propose employing an m × m square matrix with elements ηij to
describe the topology of an OSN with m nodes, as in⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
η11 · · · η1m
... ηij
...
ηm1 · · · ηmm
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ηij ∈ [0, 1] (5.2.2)
wherein ηij represents the probability of information spreading from user i to user
j, including the probability of user i forwarding information to user j (pij) and the
probability of user j believing it (qij). Therefore, we generally have ηij = pij × qij.
Thirdly, we introduce two indicators openi(t) and spri(t) to represent the events
of OSN users checking newly arrived information and forwarding it to their social
neighbors if they are willing to do that. In the real world, most people may not stay
online in an OSN all day, and therefore will not receive information and forward it to
others instantly. Therefore, we let openi(t) = 1 if users read new information at time
t. Otherwise, we let openi(t) = 0. Similarly, we have spri(t) = 1 when users spread
the information but 0 if they decide not to do so. Note that ∼ openi(t) and ∼ spri(t)
are the negations of openi(t) and spri(t).
5.2.2 SXX and SXR
We derive the state transition graph of an arbitrary node in OSN. As shown in
Fig. 5.1, a node enters the misled or insider state when the user checks receivings
100
(openi(t) = 1) and believes negative (Mis.) or positive information (Ins.). This node
then becomes contagious or active if the user is willing to forward the information
to social neighbors (spri(t) = 1). After that, a user stays in the dormant or immu-
nized state until being infected or recovered. We use v(i, t) and r(i, t) to denote the
probability of user i being infected or recovered. It should be noted that people only
spread information when they are contagious or active.
In this chapter, we propose using the Susceptible-X-X (SXX) and the Susceptible-
X-Recovered (SXR) to describe the information propagation in OSNs. For SXX,
people are originally susceptible to both kinds of information. They will then switch
between the states of believing positive (Rec.) or negative information (Inf.). In
contrast, people of SXR will no longer believe the negative information after they
accept the positive information once. To facilitate the modeling, we introduce w(i, t)
as the probability of user i being infected from the recovered state. Then, depending
on the propagation of SXX or SXR, we have
w(i, t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v(i, t), for SXX
0, for SXR
(5.2.3)
5.2.3 Modeling Propagation Dynamics
Given a topology of an OSN withm nodes, we can estimate the number of susceptible,
infected and recovered users at time t, S(t), I(t) and R(t), as in
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
S(t) = m− I(t)−R(t)
I(t) =
∑m
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Inf.)
R(t) =
∑m
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Rec.)
(5.2.4)
Proof. Take I(t) for example. We use value 1 to substitute the infected state and
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Figure 5.1: State transition graph of a node in the topology.
value 0 as the states excluding the infected state. Then, we have
E[Xi(t)] = P (Xi(t) = 1)× 1 + P (Xi(t) = 0)× 0
= P (Xi(t) = Inf.)
(5.2.5)
In probability theory, we generally have the identity E[
∑m
i=1Xi(t)] =
∑m
i=1E[Xi(t)].
Thus, we can easily derive the following
I(t) = E
[ m∑
i=1
Xi(t)
]
=
m∑
i=1
P (Xi(t) = Inf.) (5.2.6)
Similarly, we can derive the calculation of R(t) and obtain S(t) = m− I(t)−R(t).
As shown in Fig. 5.1, a susceptible user may believe the negative information and
the node enters the infected state. An infected node may also be recovered if this user
accepts the positive information. Based on the state transition graph (Fig. 5.1), we
can easily iterate the value of P (Xi(t) = Inf.) using the discrete diﬀerence equation
as in
P (Xi(t) = Inf.) = v(i, t) · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) + w(i, t)·
P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.) + [1− r(i, t)] · P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.)
(5.2.7)
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A node will stay in the susceptible state if the user has not been infected or recovered.
Thus, we can also iterate the value of P (Xi(t) = Sus.) and further derive the value
of P (Xi(t) = Rec.) as in
P (Xi(t) = Sus.) =
[
1− v(i, t)− r(i, t)] · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) (5.2.8)
P (Xi(t) = Rec.) = 1− P (Xi(t) = Sus.)− P (Xi(t) = Inf.) (5.2.9)
We adopt discrete time to model the propagation dynamics. The length of each time
tick relies on the real environment. It can be one minute, one hour or one day. For
the convenience of readers, we list the major variables in Table 5.1.
5.3 User Making Choice About Information
Depending on the ways a user believes OSN messages, we can derive diﬀerent values
of r(i, t) and v(i, t).
5.3.1 Optimistic or Pessimistic Choices
Firstly, we consider the case that people are optimistic or pessimistic about the re-
ceived information. If people are optimistic, OSN users will absolutely believe the
positive information even if they only receive negative ones. In contrast, people will
absolutely believe the negative information if they are pessimistic.
In order to calculate the values of r(i, t) and v(i, t), a temporal variable τ is
required to represent the arbitrary time after users last check new information. In
the modeling, we need to estimate the number of unread information on each user at
current time t. However, these new pieces of information may be forwarded to users
at any time after a user last log into the OSN. As shown in Fig. 5.2, we let τ ∈ [t′, t).
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Table 5.1: Major Notations Used in this chapter
Symbol Explanation
v(i, t) Probability of user i believing negative information.
r(i, t) Probability of user i believing positive information.
u(i, t) Probability of user i refuting both kinds of information.
w(i, t) Probability of recovered user i being misled.
Xi(t) The state of a network node i at time t.
pij Probability of user i forwarding information to user j.
qij Probability of user i believing information from user j.
ηij Probability of information spreading from user i to user j.
openi(t) The indicator of user i checking new information at time t.
spri(t) The indicator of user i forwarding information at time t.
τ The arbitrary time between user i last checking new
information and the current time t (excluding t).
I(t) The number of infected users in networks at time t.
R(t) The number of recovered users in networks at time t.
S(t) The number of susceptible users in networks at time t.
m The size of users in the network.
Pos(i, t) Probability of user i not aﬀected by positive information.
Neg(i, t) Probability of user i not aﬀected by negative information.
Cpos(i, t) The number of positive copies that user i believes.
Cneg(i, t) The number of negative copies that user i believes.
This can help us accumulate the amount of unread information (excluding the ones
arrived at current time t).
We introduce Pos(i, t) and Neg(i, t) to the probability of user i not believing pos-
itive or negative information. We can derive Pos(i, t) by assuming all social neighbors
cannot convince user i of positive information. Then, according to the principle of
multiplication, we have
Pos(i, t) =
∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t) = Rec.)
]
(5.3.1)
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Figure 5.2: The value range of the arbitrary time τ for each user. t′ denotes the time a
user last checked new information.
Markov≈
∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(τ) = Act.)
]
(5.3.2)
=
( ∼ openi(t− 1)) · Pos(i, t− 1) · ∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
]
(5.3.3)
We can also derive Neg(i, t) by assuming user i refutes all negative information from
social neighbors.
Neg(i, t) =
∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P (Xj(τ) = Con.|Xi(t) = Inf.)
]
(5.3.4)
Markov≈
∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(τ) = Con.)
]
(5.3.5)
=
( ∼ openi(t− 1)) ·Neg(i, t− 1) · ∏
j∈Ni
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Con.)
]
(5.3.6)
To explain the above derivations, we take equations (5.3.1)-(5.3.3) as an example.
Firstly , user j will spread positive information to user i if user i is susceptible or has
believed the negative information. This is presented by the conditional probability
P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t) = Rec.). However, its value is computationally too expensive
to obtain, especially when the size of the neighborhood is large [24,97]. For example, if
node i has k neighbors, the total number of states needed to calculate the probability
is O(2kt). Z. Chen’s work [24] suggests the value using Markov approximation will be
accurate enough if ηij is large. Since we mainly focus on the propagation of critical
information (ηij > 0.5), we adopt Markov approximation in equations (5.3.2) and
(5.3.5). In this chapter, we use P i¯(Xj(t − 1) = Act.) and P i¯(Xj(t − 1) = Con.) to
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denote the approximate values. For more accurate computation, readers could refer
to Chapter 3 for detailed discussion. Secondly , τ is a temporary temporal variable
which helps us accumulate the number of unread pieces of information received by
each user. We then relax this temporary variable by iteration of equations (5.3.2)-
(5.3.3) and (5.3.5)-(5.3.6). Readers could refer to Chapter 2 for details.
If people are optimistic, we have the probability of being infected v(i, t) or recov-
ered r(i, t) as ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v(i, t) = Pos(i, t) · [1−Neg(i, t)] · openi(t)
r(i, t) = [1− Pos(i, t)] · openi(t)
(5.3.7)
Similarly, when people are pessimistic, we can also derive the following as⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v(i, t) = [1−Neg(i, t)] · openi(t)
r(i, t) = Neg(i, t) · [1− Pos(i, t)] · openi(t)
(5.3.8)
5.3.2 Preferable Choices
When people receive both kinds of information, they will believe either positive or
negative information according to how much either can be trusted. We introduce α
as the preference of people and ηpreij as the biased probability of user i receiving and
believing preferable information from user j. Then, we have
ηpreij = pij · [qij + α · (1− qij)] (5.3.9)
In accordance, we use β as the resistence of people and ηdisij as the biased probability
of user i receiving and believing disliked information from user j.
ηdisij = pij · qij · (1− β) (5.3.10)
We assume α (1 > α > 0) and β (1 > β > 0) are independent to each other. Given a
preference (α) and a resistence (β), we have ηpreij > ηij > η
dis
ij .
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If we take people preferring positive information as an example, people have no
bias about making choices if α, β = 0. When α, β > 0, we can compute Pos(i, t)
and Neg(i, t) by replacing ηij with η
pre
ij and η
dis
ij in equations (5.3.3) and (5.3.6). We
can also estimate the number of positive and negative information copies that user i
believes (Cpos(i, t) and Cneg(i, t)) as in
Cpos(i, t) =
∑
j∈Ni
[
ηpreji · P (Xj(τ) = Act.|Xi(t) = Rec.)
]
≈ ( ∼ openi(t− 1)) · Cpos(i, t− 1) +
∑
j∈Ni
[
ηpreji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
] (5.3.11)
Cneg(i, t) =
∑
j∈Ni
[
ηdisji · P (Xj(τ) = Con.|Xi(t) = Inf.)
]
≈ ( ∼ openi(t− 1)) · Cneg(i, t− 1) +
∑
j∈Ni
[
ηdisji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Con.)
] (5.3.12)
The derivation of Cpos(i, t) and Cneg(i, t) is similar to equations (5.3.1)-(5.3.3) and
(5.3.4)-(5.3.6) in Section 5.3.1.
In this case, when Pos(i, t) = Neg(i, t) = 1, we have v(i, t) = r(i, t) = 0. When
Pos(i, t) × Neg(i, t) = 1, user i receives information from social neighbors. We can
distribute the probabilities that people choose either positive or negative information
according to the ratio of Cpos(i, t) and Cneg(i, t) as in
r(i, t) =
(
1− Pos(i, t) ·Neg(i, t)) · Cpos(i, t)
Cpos(i, t) + Cneg(i, t)
· openi(t) (5.3.13)
v(i, t) =
(
1− Pos(i, t) ·Neg(i, t)) · Cneg(i, t)
Cpos(i, t) + Cneg(i, t)
· openi(t) (5.3.14)
5.3.3 Alternative Choices
When people are making alternative choices, people are actually doing ”Yes-or-No”
questions. They have to accept either positive or negative information, but cannot
refute both. We say an arbitrary user i believes positive information if this user
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accepts positive information or refuses to accept negative information. We can also
say user i believes negative information if this user accepts negative information
or rejects positive information. Thus, we can estimate the values of Cpos(i, t) and
Cneg(i, t) as in
Cpos(i, t) =( ∼ openi(t− 1)) · Cpos(i, t− 1) +
∑
j∈Ni
[
pji · qji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
]
+
∑
j∈Ni
[
pji · (1− qji) · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Con.)
] (5.3.15)
Cneg(i, t) =( ∼ openi(t− 1)) · Cneg(i, t− 1) +
∑
j∈Ni
[
pji · qji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Con.)
]
+
∑
j∈Ni
[
pji · (1− qji) · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
] (5.3.16)
Similar to Pos(i, t) and Neg(i, t), we compute the probability of user i not re-
ceiving any positive or negative information from social neighbors at time t (Υpos(i, t)
and Υneg(i, t)) as in
Υpos(i, t) =
( ∼ openi(t− 1)) ·Υpos(i, t− 1) · ∏
j∈Ni
[
1− pji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Act.)
]
(5.3.17)
Υneg(i, t) =
( ∼ openi(t− 1)) ·Υneg(i, t− 1) · ∏
j∈Ni
[
1− pji · P i¯(Xj(t− 1) = Con.)
]
(5.3.18)
The value of 1−Υpos(i, t)·Υneg(i, t) is the probability that user i has received positive,
negative or both kinds of information. When Υpos(i, t) · Υneg(i, t) = 1, user i does
not receive any information from social neighbors. According to the ratio of Cpos(i, t)
and Cneg(i, t), we then compute r(i, t) and v(i, t) as in
r(i, t) =
(
1−Υpos(i, t) ·Υneg(i, t)) · Cpos(i, t)
Cpos(i, t) + Cneg(i, t)
· openi(t) (5.3.19)
v(i, t) =
(
1−Υpos(i, t) ·Υneg(i, t)) · Cneg(i, t)
Cpos(i, t) + Cneg(i, t)
· openi(t) (5.3.20)
108
п

 

п
Figure 5.3: The illustration of Markov approximation.
5.3.4 Markov Approximation
In our model, we use Markov approximation in the derivations (equations (5.3.2),
(5.3.5), (5.3.11), (5.3.12), (5.3.15), (5.3.16), (5.3.17) and (5.3.18)). Given a simple
example in Fig. 5.3, node A spreads information to node B and C. Node C further af-
fects D, E and back to A. In Markov approximation, the modeling does not allow node
B and C to spread information to node A reversely, but it admits the overestimation
from D, E back to A.
Firstly, we introduce the probability of user i not believing the positive informa-
tion from social neighbors except the neighbor x, Posx¯(i, t). Similarly, we introduce
Negx¯(i, t), and then we have
Posx¯(i, t) =
∏
x,j∈Ni
x =j
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(τ) = Act.)
]
(5.3.21)
Negx¯(i, t) =
∏
x,j∈Ni
x =j
[
1− ηji · P i¯(Xj(τ) = Con.)
]
(5.3.22)
Using equations (5.3.7), (5.3.8), (5.3.13) and (5.3.14), we can easily obtain the prob-
ability of user i being infected or recovered by social neighbors except the neighbor x
(vx¯(i, t), rx¯(i, t) and wx¯(i, t)). Based on the state transition graph (Fig. 5.1), we can
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derive the followings:
P x¯(Xi(t) = Act.) = spri(t) ·
[
1− wx¯(i, t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Ins.) (5.3.23)
P x¯(Xi(t) = Con.) = spri(t) ·
[
1− rx¯(i, t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Mis.) (5.3.24)
Since the value of wx¯(i, t) is equal to vx¯(i, t) for SXX and 0 for SXR (refer to equation
(5.2.3)), we can compute the value of P x¯(Xi(t) = Mis.) and P
x¯(Xi(t) = Ins.) for
SXX as in
P x¯(Xi(t) = Mis.) = [1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Inf.)] · vx¯(i, t)+
[1− rx¯(i, t)] · [1− spri(t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Mis.)
(5.3.25)
P x¯(Xi(t) = Ins.) = [1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.)] · rx¯(i, t)+
[1− vx¯(i, t)] · [1− spri(t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Ins.)
(5.3.26)
Similarly for SXR, we can also derive the following:
P x¯(Xi(t) = Mis.) = P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) · vx¯(i, t)+
[1− rx¯(i, t)] · [1− spri(t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Mis.)
(5.3.27)
P x¯(Xi(t) = Ins.) = [1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.)] · rx¯(i, t)+
[1− spri(t)] · P x¯(Xi(t− 1) = Ins.)
(5.3.28)
Equations (5.3.23)-(5.3.28) have provided an iteration mechanism to compute the
values of P x¯(Xi(t) = Mis.) and P
x¯(Xi(t) = Ins.). Given an arbitrary user i with
k neighbors, we can see the complexity has largely decreased by only keeping 2 × k
states.
5.4 Correctness Investigation
In this ﬁeld, there are no real traces of either positive or negative information spread-
ing in popular OSNs. All existing research, such as [13, 21, 24, 82, 97], adopts simula-
tions to evaluate analytical models. In order to evaluate the accuracy of our proposed
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Figure 5.4: Empirical proofs of the modeling accuracy. General settings: 1) Facebook;
2) Optimistic choices; 3) tinject = 100. Speciﬁc settings: (A) E(ηij) = 0.9, SXX; (B)
E(ηij) = 0.9, SXR; (C) E(ηij) = 0.6, SXX; (D) E(ηij) = 0.6, SXR.
Table 5.2: Basic Properties of the Network Topologies
Facebook [84] Google Plus [45]
Number of nodes 45814 264004
Number of links 4693129 47130325
Average degree 5.76 10.04
Max outdegree 199 5739
Max indegree 157 3063
model, we run modeling and simulations on two real OSNs: Facebook [84] and Google
Plus [44,45]. We mainly focus on the critical information in our modeling. Since the
real critical information, such as widespread rumors and oﬃcial announcements, gen-
erally spreads from popular or highly authorized sources [77], we start the modeling
and simulations from two highly-connected nodes in the networks. The spread of the
two kinds of information will start at diﬀerent times. We introduce tinject to denote
the delay of the second kind of information.
All the experiments were conducted on a server running Microsoft Windows Server
2008 with 8 CPUs and 32G memory. The implementation was done in C++ and
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Figure 5.5: Empirical proofs of the modeling accuracy. General settings: 1) Google+;
2) Optimistic choices; 3) tinject = 100. Speciﬁc settings: (A) E(ηij) = 0.9, SXX; (B)
E(ηij) = 0.9, SXR; (C) E(ηij) = 0.6, SXX; (D) E(ηij) = 0.6, SXR.
Matlab2012. The random numbers are produced by the C++ TR1 library extensions.
The simulation results are averaged over 100 runs. The number of 100 comes from
the discussion in [112]. We choose typical parameters to validate the accuracy but
leave the analysis of parameter impact to Section 5.6. The basic properties of the two
tested topologies are listed in Table 5.2.
5.4.1 Evaluation of Optimistic or Pessimistic Choices
Firstly, we evaluate people making optimistic or pessimistic choices. Due to symmetry
of the model, we only use an optimistic case as an example (refer to Section 5.6.1 for
details).
1) Simulation : given an infected user i, information is forwarded to neighbors
by comparing a random number with ηij. Recall that ηij = pij · qij. Thus, once
the delivery succeeds, user j will receive and believe this piece of information. A
user will not move into the inf. state if he obtains at least one piece of positive
information. I(t) and R(t) are obtained by counting the infected and recovered users
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Figure 5.6: Empirical proofs of the modeling accuracy. General settings: 1) E(ηpreij ) =
0.825, E(ηdisij ) = 0.675; 2) Preferable choices; 3) tinject = 100. Speciﬁc settings: (A)
Facebook, SXX; (B) Facebook, SXR; (C) Google+, SXX; (D) Google+, SXR.
in the network.
2) Settings : we assume user i checks new information every Ti time tick and
forwards messages every Fi time tick (Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10), refer to Section 5.6.5 for
details). The positive information will be injected into the networks at time 100
(Tinject = 100, refer to section 5.6.2 for details). The accuracy of SXX and SXR will
be examined by setting E(ηij) = 0.9 or 0.6.
3) Results : the Facebook results are shown in Fig. 5.4. We can see that our
modeling results are quite close to the simulations. The error in Fig. 5.4(D) is a
slightly large, but we still have (error < 10%× I(t)). We then examine the accuracy
in the Google Plus network. As shown in Fig. 5.5, our modeling results are also very
accurate.
4) Analysis : for the SXX model, people can change their original state by be-
lieving the opposite kind of information. Thus, users may sway between two kinds of
information. This is the reason why we see many oscillations in the SXX results. For
the SXR model, people recover and will not believe the negative information again.
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Figure 5.7: Empirical proofs of the modeling accuracy. General settings: 1) E(pij) = 0.75,
E(qij) = 0.75; 2) Alternative choices; 3) tinject = 100. Speciﬁc settings: (A) Facebook,
SXX; (B) Facebook, SXR; (C) Google+, SXX; (D) Google+, SXR.
Thus, I(t) decreases fast in the SXR results.
5.4.2 Evaluation of Preferable Choices
Secondly, we evaluated the case of people making preferable choices. We choose the
typical values of α and β for the evaluation. For the impact of these two variables,
please refer to Section 5.6.3 for details.
1) Simulation : given an recovered user i, positive information is forwarded to
neighbors according to the value of ηpreij . A random number is compared with η
pre
ij
to see if the delivery succeeds. The same happens on negative information with ηdisij .
Once the delivery succeeds, user j believes this piece of information. The ﬁnal decision
depends on the ratio of positive and negative information copies.
2) Settings : We still assume Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10) and Tinject = 100. To be generic,
we set α, β = 10% and ηij = 0.75. Thus, we have E(η
pre
ij ) = 0.825 and E(η
dis
ij ) = 0.675.
3) Results : the Facebook results are shown in Fig. 5.6(A) and (B). The Google
Plus results are shown in Fig. 5.6(C) and (D). All modeling results are very close to
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the simulations. The errors in Fig. 5.6(B) are a slightly large, but still acceptable
(error < 10%× I(t)).
4) Analysis : for people making preferable choices, users ﬁnally choose an infor-
mation by the ratio of diﬀerent information copies. They will not absolutely believe
positive or negative information even if they have a preference (α) or resistance (β).
Thus, we can see many strong oscillations and curves cross the SXX results. For the
SXR model, similar to the previous case, I(t) drops quickly in the SXR results after
we inject positive information.
5.4.3 Evaluation of Alternative Choices
Finally, we evaluate the accuracy when people make alternative choices. The impact
of pij and qij will be discussed in Section 5.6.4.
1) Simulation : given an infected user i, information is forwarded to neighbors
according to the values of pij. Random numbers will be compared with qij to check
if user j believes the positive or negative information. The ﬁnal decision depends on
the ratio of believed copies of positive and negative information.
2) Settings : We still assume Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10) and Tinject = 100. To be generic,
we set pij = 0.75 and qij = 0.75. Thus, we have E(ηij) = 0.56.
3) Results : the Facebook results are shown in Fig. 5.7(A) and (B). The Google
Plus results are shown in Fig. 5.7(C) and (D). All modeling results are quite accurate.
Another fact in Fig. 5.4 is that the number of I(t) and R(t) in the SXX model are
very close to each other. For the convenience of readers, we have zoomed the results
in the inset ﬁgures.
4) Analysis : for people making alternative choices, a user refuting negative
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information means this user believes the opposite positive information. Thus, we can
see R(t) goes up with I(t) before we inject positive information into the network.
Users have to choose one kind of information (either positive or negative) with the
probabilities qij or 1 − qij. Thus, I(t) and R(t) are very close to each other in the
SXX modeling. Similar to previous cases, the number of I(t) drops quickly in the
SXR results.
5.5 Comparison with Previous Models
5.5.1 ICM and LTM
For the propagation of competitive information, the most basic and well-studied mod-
els are the independent cascade model (ICM) and the linear threshold model (LTM).
In this ﬁeld, we ﬁnd many deviations of these two models [9, 11, 13, 20, 26, 46, 52, 82]
but the following ICM and LTM lie at the core of most model variants.
ICM : ICM starts with an initial set of active nodes. The process unfolds in
discrete steps according to the randomized rules: when an arbitrary node i ﬁrst
becomes active in step t, it is given a single chance to activate each of the currently
inactive neighbors. It will succeed with the probability xij (j ∈ Ni), and if user i
has multiple newly activated neighbors, their attempts are sequenced in an arbitrary
order. Once a node becomes active, it will remain active forever.
LTM : node i is inﬂuenced by neighbors according to the weight xij, (
∑
j∈Ni xij 
1). Given a threshold θi and an initial set of active nodes, the diﬀusion process unfolds
deterministically in discrete steps. Node i is activated if the following two conditions
are satisﬁed: 1)
∑
j∈Ni xij  θi, 2) j is active. Once a node becomes active, similar
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to ICM, it remains active forever.
When a user receives two kinds of competitive information in ICM and LTM, the
strategy adopted to make ﬁnal decisions varies according to diﬀerent environments.
Some choose “optimistic or pessimistic” [13,46], while others choose “alternative” [20].
We can also see some adopted “game theory” [26,52] and “ﬁrst come ﬁrst win” [9] to
discover optimized strategies.
5.5.2 Superiority Analysis
Compared to ICM and LTM, our model provides an analytical way to present the
propagation. We summarize the major diﬀerences as follows:
Firstly , ICM is a simulation model. LTM provides a deterministic spread process,
but each node in LTM is absolutely active or inactive. Thus, LTM is closer to a
simulation model than an analytical one. Researchers can derive the probability of
being in either state for each node by averaging over many runs of a simulation, but
simulation models cannot quantify the reasons why initial parameters result in such
probabilities and further disclose the essence.
Secondly , ICM and LTM are very basic models. We separately analyzed two of
the diﬀerences from our model. The experiments were carried out using Facebook
and people who made optimistic choices as an example. Firstly, when our model can
present the processes of people checking and forwarding information randomly (e.g.,
Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10)), ICM and LTM can only use equivalent constants for Ti and Fi
(e.g., Ti, Fi = 20). As shown in Fig.5.8, their results consequently show stair-like
behaviors which are obviously not realistic in the real world. Secondly, we investigate
state transition processes. To avoid the impact from temporal factors, both positive
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Figure 5.8: Diﬀerences compared in temporal spread dynamics. “New”: Our model; “Old”:
ICM and LTM. Settings: 1) Facebook; 2) Optimistic choices; 3)E(ηij) = 0.75; 4) tinject =
100.
and negative information is injected at the beginning (Tinject = 0). We can see from
Fig. 5.9 that their results largely deviate from our SXX and SXR results. In ICM and
LTM, a node will remain infected or recovered till the spread ends. This assumption
does not suit spread cases in real OSNs.
Thirdly , we cannot quantify the superiority of our model in presenting people
making choices because it is related to a highly social environment. Previous ICM
and LTM were originally devoted to the marketing area and particle systems [49].
On the contrary, we derive strategies based on the real information propagation in
OSNs (refer to Section 5.1). Thus, our approach is more suitable to modeling the
propagation of OSN competitive information.
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Figure 5.9: Diﬀerences compared in state transition schema. “New”: Our model; “Old”:
ICM and LTM. Settings: 1) Facebook; 2) Optimistic choices; 3)E(ηij) = 0.75; 4) tinject = 0.
5.6 Parameter Studies
Based on the analytical model, we further explore the impact of diﬀerent parameters
to the propagation dynamics, including 1) optimistic and pessimistic; 2) Tinject; 3)
α, β; 4) qij; 5) openi(t), spri(t).
5.6.1 Optimistic and Pessimistic
We investigate the diﬀerences of people making optimistic or pessimistic choices.
Technically, if people receive both kinds of information and make optimistic choices,
they will absolutely believe the positive information regardless of the negative infor-
mation. Alternatively, those who make pessimistic choices will absolutely believe the
negative information. In the experiments, to avoid inﬂuence from other parameters,
we set Tinject = 0, Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10) and E(ηij) = 0.75. We run experiments on both
Facebook and Google Plus using SXX and SXR mechanisms.
As shown in Fig. 5.10(A),(C), the SXX results of both strategies are symmetric.
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Figure 5.10: The diﬀerences of people making optimistic and pessimistic choices. (A)
Facebook; (B) Facebook; (C) Google+; (D) Google+. Settings: 1)E(ηij) = 0.75; 2) tinject =
0.
In the results of Fig. 5.10(B),(D), we ﬁnd I(t) of SXR drops faster if people make
pessimistic choices. Both the optimistic and pessimistic strategies have so far behaved
as one would expect them to. We further investigate the estimated number of conta-
gious nodes (
∑
i P (Xi(t) = Con.)) and active nodes (
∑
i P (Xi(t) = Act.)). As shown
in Fig.5.11, I(t) and R(t) ﬂuctuate in the propagation dynamics. In Fig. 5.11(A),(C),
we introduce two ellipses. We ﬁnd active nodes are more than contagious if people
make optimistic choices. Otherwise, contagious nodes will be more. However, when
the propagation continues to the outside of the ellipses, the contagious node or active
nodes are comparable. We have similar results in Fig. 5.11(B),(D), but there will
be no contagious nodes and active nodes after 200 time ticks more or less. From
the results of Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11, we ﬁnd the propagation is mainly decided by
the early spreading dynamics if people make optimistic or pessimistic choices on their
receiving.
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Figure 5.11: The number of contagious and active nodes. (A) Facebook; (B) Facebook;
(C) Google+; (D) Google+. Settings: 1)E(ηij) = 0.75; 2) tinject = 0.
5.6.2 Impact of Tinject
In Section 5.4, we assume the positive information is injected into the network at time
100. However, the value of Tinject may considerably aﬀect the spreading dynamics. To
exclusively investigate the impact of Tinject, we set Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10), E(ηij) = 0.75
and people making preferable choices (α = β = 0). At this moment, the group of
people who believe positive information is fair to the group of people who believe
negative information. The experiments are run on both Facebook and Google Plus
using SXX and SXR. We test Tinject at the values 0, 100 and 200.
We see two features according to the results in Fig. 5.12. Firstly, the propagation
under diﬀerent settings will ﬁnally become steady even though there are oscillations
in Fig. 5.12(A),(B). The ﬁnal results (T (t), R(t)) will be approximately equal to a
constant. Secondly, we can observe in Fig. 5.12(A),(C) that the spread of negative
information reaches the largest scale at the early time stage. This feature is the same
as the results in Section 5.6.1.
The results inspire something in the real world. We informally take the rumor
121
    






 [

$
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
ILQ
IHF
WHG
QR
GH
V,
W
    





 [

%
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
IUH
FR
YH
UHG
QR
GH
V5
W
    






 [

&
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
ILQ
IHF
WHG
QR
GH
V,
W
    



 [

'
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
IUH
FR
YH
UHG
QR
GH
V5
W
7LQMHFW  7LQMHFW  7LQMHFW 
    




 [

+
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
IUH
FR
YH
UHG
QR
GH
V5
W
    




 [

*
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
ILQ
IHF
WHG
QR
GH
V,
W
    




 [

)
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
IUH
FR
YH
UHG
QR
GH
V5
W
    




 [

7LPHWLFNVW
(
7K
HQ
XP
EH
UR
ILQ
IHF
WHG
QR
GH
V,
W 6;;
6;; 6;56;; 6;5
6;; 6;5 6;5
Figure 5.12: Positive information is injected at diﬀerent times. (A)-(D) Facebook; (E)-(H)
Google+. Settings: 1)E(ηij) = 0.75; 2) Preferable; 3) α = 0, β = 0.
“Barack Obama was born in Kenya” for example. During the campaign for president,
Obama was questioned whether he was a native-born citizen. If not, under Article
Two of the U.S. Constitution, he was ineligible to be President of the United States.
In response to the rumor, Obama posted an image of his birth certiﬁcate. Based on
our analysis, the time it takes for the conspirator to surface the rumor is an important
issue. Firstly, the number of people believing the rumor would be identical in the
long term. Secondly, Obama needed time to collect evidence to clarify the rumor. If
the conspirator spread the rumor a short time before the poll, Obama’s opponents
might possibly win more votes in the campaign.
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Figure 5.13: Impact of α and β for people making alternative choices. (A) Facebook; (B)
Facebook; (C) Google+; (D) Google+. Settings: 1) Tinject = 0; 2) Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10); 3)
pij = qij = 0.75.
5.6.3 Impact of α, β
The values of α and β decide the preference and the resistance of people when they
make preferable choices. In order to exclusively investigate the impacts of α and β,
we set Tinject = 0, Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10) and pij = qij = 0.75. We test α and β at values
25% and 50%. We can compute ηpreij = 0.8325 and η
dis
ij = 0.6075 for α = β = 25%.
We also have ηpreij = 0.855 and η
dis
ij = 0.405 for α = β = 50%. Experiments are run
in Facebook and Google Plus platforms with SXX and SXR spreading mechanisms.
As shown in Fig. 5.13, the values of α and β have considerable impact on the
propagation dynamics. Particularly for SXX, when α and β increase from 25% to
50%, the results of I(t) and R(t) deviate more from each other. For SXR, the impact
is slightly less. This is because the probability of people believing negative information
largely decreases when people have resistance to it. As a result, the number of people
believing negative information R(t) drops at the very beginning of the propagation.
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Figure 5.14: Impact of qij for people making alternative choices. (A) Facebook; (B)
Facebook; (C) Google+; (D) Google+. Settings: 1) Tinject = 0; 2) Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10); 3)
pij = 1.
5.6.4 Impact of qij for Alternative Choices
When people make alternative choices, if they believe positive information with prob-
ability qij, they will believe negative information with probability 1 − qij (refer to
Section 5.3.3). In order to exclusively investigate the impact of qij, we set Tinject = 0,
Ti, Fi ∼ N(20, 10) and pij = 1. We test qij at values 0.6, 0.75 and 0.9.
The results are shown in Fig. 5.14. We can see the values of qij almost have no
impact on the propagation when people make alternative choices. Particularly for the
SXX spreading mechanism, all results coincide with each other. For the SXR case,
when qij increases, I(t) will increase and R(t) will decrease. However, the diﬀerences
are not signiﬁcant.
In the real world, people may have a preference for making alternative choices. For
example, they prefer positive information rather than negative information. Under
this condition, the results will not coincide with each other. However, diﬀerences
come from the preference and not the value of qij. Readers can refer to Section 5.6.3
for the impacts of people’s preference.
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Figure 5.15: Impact of openi(t), spri(t). (A) Facebook; (B) Facebook; (C) Google+; (D)
Google+. Settings: 1) Tinject = 0; 2) Preferable; 2) η
pos
ij = η
neg
ij = 0.75.
5.6.5 Impact of openi(t), spri(t)
The temporal propagation dynamics are mainly presented by the ﬂags openi(t) and
spri(t) in our model. Following the considerations in [24, 97, 112], we assume user i
checks newly arrived information every Ti time ticks and forwards information every
Fi time ticks. Thus, we have openi(t) = 1 if (t mod Ti = 0) and spri(t) = 1 if (t
mod Fi = 0). The values of Ti and Fi are generated by Gaussian distribution. We
set ηposij = η
neg
ij = 0.75, Tinject = 0 and people making preferable choices. We let Ti
and Fi follow N(20, 10) and N(40, 20).
As shown in Fig. 5.15, the values of openi(t) and spri(t) have some impacts on
the propagation dynamics. We summarize two features from the results of Fig. 5.15:
1) the ﬁnal results of the propagation will stay the same when the values of openi(t)
and spri(t) change; 2) the spreading speed will decrease if the values of openi(t) and
spri(t) increase. These two features are in line with our expectation on the impact of
openi(t) and spri(t).
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5.7 Related Work of This Chapter
5.7.1 Propagation Modeling Techniques
Over the past decade, substantial eﬀort has been given to modeling the propagation
of information. For competitive information, most researchers borrowed basic and
well-studied ICM and LTM [9, 11, 13, 20, 26, 46, 52, 82] from the marketing area and
particle systems. We have compared our model with ICM and LTM in Section 5.5.
In the following, we mainly focus on the propagation models of single information.
The most widely adopted propagation models of single information [25,34,41,51,
86, 104, 105] comes from epidemiology since epidemic spreads are similar to the pro-
cesses of information dissemination. Epidemic models use diﬀerential equations to cal-
culate the number of infected nodes in networks without considering the probabilities
of each node being infected. Thus, these kinds of models are weak to investigate where,
when and how many nodes are needed to control the information dissemination [92].
Moreover, as earlier discussed in [112], the epidemic models [25,34,41,51,86,104,105]
may greatly overestimate the spreading speed due to their implicit ‘homogeneous
mixing’ assumption.
The works [36,42,103,106,112] relied on simulations to model the propagation of
malicious information, such as Internet worms. Their simulation models avoid the
problem of ‘homogeneous mixing’ assumption but cannot provide analytical study on
the propagation.
There are other propagation models, such as [8, 18, 24, 97] adopt diﬀerence equa-
tions to present the propagation dynamics of information. Our proposed model is
close to their work but our work collaborates the spread processes and presents the
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interaction of two kinds of information.
5.7.2 Propagation Control Techniques
On the basis of propagation models, researchers have studied a way to control (re-
strain or accelerate) the propagation of information. In fact, the problem of selecting
the most inﬂuential nodes is NP-hard [11, 49]. Thus, to maximize the inﬂuence of
information, some researchers [13,20,21,49,52] adopt heuristic algorithms to approx-
imate the optimal solution. There are also some works [9, 26, 52, 82] that use game
theory to ﬁnd the optimal strategies.
Alternatively, to restrain the propagation of information, X. He et al. [46] adopted
a greedy algorithm to search the most controllable nodes, and P. Wang et al. [88]
studied the propagation of mobile viruses. Their results explain why there has yet
to be a major outbreak of a mobile virus. The works of [42, 57, 96] explored the
counter-intuitive fact that most inﬂuential nodes in OSNs may not be the most highly-
connected nodes. Moreover, the works of [55,66] examined the most inﬂuential edges
in networks.
Compared with this work, this chapter provides an accurate propagation model.
This model can serve as a fundamental work to support the research of propagation
control techniques.
5.8 Conclusion for This Chapter
In this chapter, we studied the propagation of both positive and negative information
in OSNs. We proposed an analytical model using diﬀerence equations and considered
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people making diﬀerent choices. The experiment results showed the accuracy of our
model. On the basis of our model, we carried out a further series of experiments and
examined the impacts of parameters on the propagation.
In the future, the propagation of multiple kinds of information will be modeled.
This information can be supportive or competitive. We will optimize the control-
lability of the propagation on the basis of our proposed analytical model. Further
important work in the future intends to use our model to explain or predict real
information propagation. We believe our work presented in this chapter is of great
signiﬁcance for both academia and practical use.
128
Chapter 6
Restraining the Spread of Rumors
in Online Social Networks
6.1 Introduction
The popularity of online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook [84], Google
Plus [45] and Twitter [53] has greatly increased in recent years. OSNs have become
important platforms for the dissemination of news, ideas, opinions, etc. Unfortu-
nately, OSN is a double-edged sword. The openness of OSN platforms also enables
rumors, gossips and other forms of disinformation to spread all around the Internet.
Recent research has shown that rumors can spread incredibly fast in OSNs [31]. In
the real world, rumor has caused great damage to our society. For example, the rumor
“Two explosions in White House and Obama is injured” happened on April 23, 2013
and led to losses of 10 billion USD losses before the rumor was clariﬁed [77].
Currently, there are two main kinds of strategies used for restraining rumors in
OSNs, including blocking rumors at important users [7, 22, 27–30, 32, 37, 42, 47, 50,
54, 57, 61, 66, 71–74, 76, 80, 87, 96, 103, 108, 112] and clarifying rumors by spreading
truths [13, 41, 43, 55, 82, 85]. We can further categorize the ﬁrst strategy into two
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groups according to their measures in identifying the most important users: the
most inﬂuential users [7, 28–30, 32, 37, 42, 47, 50, 57, 61, 66, 76, 80, 96, 103, 112] and the
community bridges [22, 27, 54, 71–74,87,108].
Every kind of strategy has pros and cons. Each method claims better performance
among all the others according to their own considerations and environments. How-
ever, there must be one that stands out from the rest. Because there does not exist a
universal standard to evaluate all of them together, the question of which method is
the best has long been important but diﬃcult to answer. Accordingly, previous work
mainly focused on the ‘vertical ’ comparison (methods inside their own category), such
as the work of [50,57], but not on the ‘horizontal ’ comparison (methods from diﬀerent
categories). All of these methods are supposed to restrain the spread of rumors in
OSNs. Though it is diﬃcult, in this chapter we try to answer this unsolved question.
To numerically evaluate diﬀerent methods, we introduce a mathematical model
to present the spread of rumors and truths. This is a discrete model that can easily
locate the most important nodes in the modeling. Thus, we can implement diﬀerent
strategies on this mathematical platform in order to evaluate their impact on the
spread of rumors and truths. Through a series of empirical and theoretical analysis
using real OSNs, we are able to disclose the answer to the unsolved question.
In the real world, blocking rumors at important users may incur criticism because
it runs the risk of violating human rights. On the other hand, the probability of
people believing the truths varies according to many social factors. Therefore, it is
very important to ﬁnd the optimal strategy to restrain rumors, which possibly should
integrate both strategies. The discussion on which method is the best will be a small,
but important step towards the solution of this aspect of the work. Therefore, we are
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further motivated to explore the numerical relation and equivalence between diﬀerent
methods. Our work is of great academic and practical signiﬁcance to society.
On the basis of the work presented in this chapter, we summarize our contributions
as follows:
• We are among the ﬁrst to build a mathematical model in order to evaluate the
eﬃciency of diﬀerent rumor restraining methods.
• We are among the ﬁrst to investigate various proactive measures using both the
empirical and theoretical analysis. The results suggest the degree and between-
ness measures have better performances among others.
• We further investigate the eﬃciency of the truth clariﬁcation method. We ﬁnd
this method has long-term performance while the degree measure can provide
better performance in the early stages of the rumor spreading.
• We are also among the ﬁrst to explore strategies of diﬀerent rumor restraining
methods working together. Our analysis provides the exact numeric equivalence
between the two strategies.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 introduces the ana-
lytical model. In Section 6.3, we carry out both an empirical and theoretical analysis
to ﬁnd the best proactive measure. We further investigate the eﬃciency of spreading
truths in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 explores the strategy of diﬀerent methods working
together. Further discussion and the conclusion will be presented in Section 6.6 and
6.7 respectively.
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Figure 6.1: The state transition graph of a node in the topology.
6.2 Propagation Modeling Primer
In this section, we build the mathematical model in order to analyze the spread of
rumors and investigate the methods of restraining their propagation.
6.2.1 Modeling Nodes, Topology and Social Factors
In the real world, people may believe rumors, truths or may not have heard of any
information from an OSN. Let random variable Xi(t) represent the state of user i
at discrete time t. We borrow the concepts from epidemics and derive the values of
Xi(t) as follows
Xi(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Sus., susceptible
Def., defended
Rec., recovered
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Act., active
Imm., immunized
Inf., infected
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Con., contagious
Mis., misled
(6.2.1)
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Firstly , every user is presumed to be susceptible (Xi(t) = Sus.) at the beginning.
If a user is proactively controlled and will block rumors, the node of this user is at
the Def. state. An arbitrary user i believes the rumor if Xi(t) = Inf. or the truth if
Xi(t) = Rec. Secondly , users will seldom forward the same messages of the rumor
or the truth multiple times to ‘persuade’ their social friends into accepting what they
have believed. Thus, we assume OSN users distribute the rumor or the truth only
once at the time they get infected (Xi(t) = Con.) or recovered (Xi(t) = Act.). After
this, they will stop to spread the rumor (Xi(t) = Mis.) or the truth (Xi(t) = Imm.).
Thirdly , the origins of the true news in the real world usually has high prestige
among the masses. Thus, an infected user can be recovered and will not be infected
again. The user will stay immunized after he or she trusts the truth. We provide the
state transition graph for an arbitrary user in Fig. 6.1. We can see that most users
will ﬁnally believe the truth as the Imm. state is an absorbing state.
The nodes and the topology are the basic elements for the propagation of OSN
rumors and truths. Given an OSN, we derive the topology of it. A node in the
topology denotes a user in the OSN. In this chapter, we propose employing m ×m
square matrix with elements 〈ηRij , ηTij〉 (ηRij , ηTij ∈ [0, 1]) to describe the topology of an
OSN with m nodes, as in
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
〈ηR11, ηT11〉 · · · 〈ηR1m, ηT1m〉
... 〈ηRij , ηTij〉
...
〈ηRm1, ηTm1〉 · · · 〈ηRmm, ηTmm〉
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (6.2.2)
wherein ηRij and η
T
ij denote the probability of rumors and truths spreading from user
i to user j respectively. If user i has contact with user j, we have ηRij = 0, ηTij = 0.
Otherwise, ηRij = 0, η
T
ij = 0.
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6.2.2 Modeling Propagation Dynamics
We introduce a widely approved discrete model [8, 19, 24, 56, 96, 97] to present the
propagation of rumors and truths in OSNs. The discrete model can locate each
inﬂuential node and evaluate its impact on the spread. Given a topology of an OSN
with m nodes, we can estimate the number of susceptible and recovered users at time
t, S(t) and R(t), as in ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S(t) =
∑m
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Sus.)
R(t) =
∑m
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Rec.)
(6.2.3)
wherein P (·) denotes the probability of a variable. Similarly, the number of defended
nodes at time t, D(t), is derived by computing
∑m
i=1 P (Xi(t) = Def.). Then, we can
obtain the number of infected nodes at time t, I(t), as in
I(t) = m− S(t)−R(t)−D(t) (6.2.4)
As shown in Fig. 6.1, a susceptible user may accept the rumor and the node enters the
Inf. state. An infected node may also be recovered if this user accepts the truth. We
use v(i, t) and r(i, t) to denote the probability of user i being infected or recovered.
Then, the values of P (Xi(t) = Sus.), P (Xi(t) = Rec.) and P (Xi(t) = Def.) can be
iterated using the discrete diﬀerence equations as in
P (Xi(t) = Sus.) =
[
1− v(i, t)− r(i, t)] · P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) (6.2.5)
P (Xi(t) = Rec.) = r(i, t) ·
[
1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.)
]
+ P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.) (6.2.6)
P (Xi(t) = Def.) =
[
1− r(i, t)] · P (Xi(t− 1) = Def.) (6.2.7)
We introduce Neg(i, t) and Pos(i, t) to be the probability of user i not believing
the rumor or the truth. Since the rumor and the truth come from social neighbors,
the values of Neg(i, t) and Pos(i, t) can be derived by assuming all social neighbors
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cannot convince user i of the rumor or the truth. Then, according to the principle of
multiplication, we have⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
Neg(i, t) =
∏
j∈Ni [1− ηRji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Con.)]
Pos(i, t) =
∏
j∈Ni [1− ηTji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)]
(6.2.8)
wherein Ni denotes the set of user i’s neighbors. We assume the states of nodes in
the topology are independent. Then, according to the state transitions in Fig. 6.1,
the values of P (Xi(t) = Con.) and P (Xi(t) = Act.) can be derived as in
P (Xi(t) = Con.) = P (Xi(t− 1) = Sus.) · v(i, t) (6.2.9)
P (Xi(t) = Act.) =
[
1− P (Xi(t− 1) = Rec.)
] · r(i, t) (6.2.10)
From equation (6.2.3)-(6.2.10), we adopt discrete time to model the propagation
dynamics. Note that the length of each time tick relies on the real environment. It
can be one minute, one hour or one day.
6.2.3 Modeling People Making Choices
According to the ways people believe rumors and truths, we drive diﬀerent values of
v(i, t) and r(i, t). In this chapter, we summarize two major cases on the basis of our
analysis in the real world.
1) Absolute Belief : In this case, we optimistically assume OSN users absolutely
believe the truths except they only receive rumors. Then, we can derive the values of
v(i, t) and r(i, t) as in ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v(i, t) = [1−Neg(i, t)] · Pos(i, t)
r(i, t) = 1− Pos(i, t)
(6.2.11)
In the real world, this case happens generally when the origins of true news has high
prestige among the masses. For example, when the rumor “two explosions in White
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House and Barack Obama is injured” fast spread on Twitter [77], the White House, as
an origin which has absolute credibility among most people, swiftly stopped the rumor
by clarifying and spreading the truth “Obama is ﬁne and no explosion happened.”
2) Minority is Subordinate to Majority : In this case, people do not ab-
solutely trust the origins of the truths. They believe either the rumor or the truth
according to the ratio of believers among their OSN friends. We can estimate the
number of received rumor and truth copies (CR(i, t) and CT (i, t)) for each user i as
in ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
CR(i, t) =
∑
j∈Ni [ηji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Con.)]
CT (i, t) =
∑
j∈Ni [ηji · P (Xj(t− 1) = Act.)]
(6.2.12)
Then, we derive the values of v(i, t) and r(i, t) as in
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
v(i, t) =
[1−Neg(i,t)·Pos(i,t)]·CR(i,t)
CR(i,t)+CT (i,t)
r(i, t) =
[1−Neg(i,t)·Pos(i,t)]·CT (i,t)
CR(i,t)+CT (i,t)
(6.2.13)
wherein the value of Neg(i, t)·Pos(i, t) is the probability of people refuting both kinds
of information. In the real world, “minority is subordinate to majority” (M-S-M) is a
more general case. When more friends choose to accept one kind of information, the
probability of the user believing this kind of information is larger than the probability
of choosing the opposite one.
6.2.4 Accuracy of the Modeling
Before we carry out analysis using the mathematical model, we set up simulations to
validate its correctness. The experiment topologies are two real OSNs: Facebook [84]
and Google Plus [45]. The simulations are implemented on the basis of existing
simulation work [103, 112]. We mainly focus on the critical rumors (ηRij > 0.5) in
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Figure 6.2: The accuracy evaluation of modeling compared with simulations.
this chapter. Thus, we set the propagation probabilities as ηRij = η
T
ij = 0.75, and the
spread of rumors starts at t = 0. Since the truths start to propagate after many users
have believed the rumors, we set the truth injection time as tinfect, as tinject = 3. The
implementation is in C++ and Matlab2012b.
We show the validation results in Fig. 6.2. We can see the modeling results
are quite accurate compared with the simulations. In equation (6.2.8), we assume
the states of nodes in the topology are independent. The independent assumption
has been widely used in this ﬁeld, such as the works of [19, 56, 96]. However, this
assumption may cause errors in the modeling. Readers can ﬁnd extensive analysis in
the works of [24,97]. In fact, the errors will be compromised when the modeling results
of conﬂicting information mutually subtract each other. In this chapter, we simply
adopt this assumption as we mainly focus on the comparison of diﬀerent defense
methods.
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Figure 6.3: The sorted results of the inﬂuential nodes in the Facebook topology.
6.3 Block Rumors at Important Users
In this section, we analyze proactive measures in order to ﬁnd out the most eﬃcient
one for blocking rumors. The degree measure can be directly derived from the OSN
topology. The betweenness measure is worked out using the standard algorithm [68].
We also implement the k -shell decomposition algorithm [16] to identify the core of
OSNs. To locate community bridges, we use CFinder [17] to identify the overlapped
communities and NetMiner [67] for the separated ones. We focus on the Facebook
network [84] in this section.
6.3.1 Empirical Studies
We ﬁrst work out all proactive measures and show the sorted results of inﬂuential
nodes in Fig. 6.3. For the degree measure (Fig. 6.3A), we can see the node degrees
follows the power-laws [35]. This means the nodes with large degrees are rare in
the topology but have signiﬁcant contribution to OSN connectivity. Similar results
can also be observed in the measure of betweenness (Fig.6.3B). For the core measure
(Fig.6.3C), we can see the innermost part ﬁnally leaves to be quite a small group of
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Figure 6.5: The ﬁnal steady amount of infected nodes when we apply proactive measures
with diﬀerent defense ratios.
nodes in the network.
The results of network communities are shown in Fig. 6.4. For the separated
communities (Fig. 6.4A), we ﬁnd several large communities dominate the majority of
nodes in the network. In Fig. 6.4B, we set k = 5 (refer to CFinder [17]) and obtain
similar results for the overlapped communities.
From the empirical perspective, we examine which proactive measure can be more
eﬃcient. We use λ to denote the defense ratio of nodes in OSNs, and λ ranges from
1% to 30%. We mainly focus on critical rumors in this chapter (E(ηRij) > 0.5). To be
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Figure 6.6: The propagation dynamics of rumors when we carry out defense according to
diﬀerent proactive measures.
typical, we set E(ηRij) = E(η
T
ij) = 0.6 or 0.9. In the real world, since critical rumors
often originate from the most popular users, we let the rumors in the modeling spread
from the node with large degree. The results of the rumor spreading scale are shown
in Fig. 6.5.
Observation 1: If we set the defense ratio (λ) close to 30%, the degree and be-
tweenness measures will almost stop the spread of rumors. This result is in accordance
with the percolation ratio used to stop viruses in email networks [112]. However, real
OSNs generally have large-scales. Blocking rumors at 30% users in OSNs is too many
to realize in the real world.
Observation 2: The betweenness and degree measures outperform all the other
measures, and the betweenness measure performs much better than the degree measure
if λ ≤ 20%. This result is in accordance with the works of [57, 96]. Fig. 6.5 has
presented the ﬁnal number of infected users given a rumor spreading in a network.
We further investigate the propagation dynamics of those measures (typically setting
λ = 10% or 20%). The results are shown in Fig. 6.6.
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Observation 3: The degree measure performs better than the betweenness mea-
sure in the early stage. The degree and betweenness measures outperform all others
all over the spreading procedure. However, diﬀerent from observation 2, the degree
measure has short-term better eﬃciency than the betweenness measure. This degree
measure is also suggested by [7].
6.3.2 Theoretical Studies
In this subsection, we carry out mathematical analysis in order to theoretically justify
the empirical results. To numerically evaluate diﬀerent measures, we ﬁrst introduce
a new concept ‘the contagious ability ’.
Deﬁnition (Contagious Ability). Given an OSN and an incident of rumor spreading
in this network, the contagious ability of an arbitrary node i, Ai, is deﬁned as the
number of the following nodes that can be directly or indirectly infected by node i
after it is infected.
An arbitrary user i may possibly be infected at any time in the rumor propagation
dynamics. We use Ati to denote the contagious ability of node i if the user of this
node is infected at time t. On the basis of our mathematical model, we can then
estimate the overall contagious ability of an arbitrary node i as in
E(Ai) =
∞∑
t=0
[
P (Xi(t) = Con.) · E(Ati)
]
(6.3.1)
OSN users receive and send rumors from and to their neighboring users. We use
Atij to denote the potential contagious ability caused by the rumor spread from node
i to node j at time t. We also introduce P tij to denote the potential contagious
probability of node j contributed by node i at time t. The mean value of Ati can then
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be recursively worked out as in
E(Ati) =
∑
j∈Ni
[
E(At+1ij ) + P
t+1
ij
]
(6.3.2)
We can further compute E(At+1ij ) and P
t+1
ij as in
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
E(At+1ij ) = δ
t
ij · E(At+1j )
P t+1ij = δ
t
ij · P (Xj(t+ 1) = Con.)
(6.3.3)
wherein δtij denotes the ratio of node i’s contribution to the infection of node j at
time t among all the father nodes of node j, and we have
δtij =
P (Xi(t) = Con.) · ηRij∑
k∈Nj
[
P (Xk(t) = Con.) · ηRkj
] (6.3.4)
As shown in Fig. 6.1, the Imm. state is an absorbing state. Given an OSN with a
ﬁnite number of users, we can predict the spread of rumors ﬁnally becomes steady
and the values of Ati and P (Xi(t) = Con.) converge to zero if 0  t < ∞. As a result,
the contagious ability of each node in OSNs can be recursively and reversely worked
out by setting a large ﬁnal time of the spread. Readers can refer to Section 6.6.1 for
more discussion about the contagious ability.
We further calculate the contagious time in order to numerically evaluate the
temporal eﬃciency of those measures against the spread of rumors.
Deﬁnition (Contagious Time). Given an OSN and an incident of rumor spreading
in this network, the contagious time of an arbitrary node i, Ti, is deﬁned as the mean
time of node i becoming infected in the whole propagation.
Conceptually, the contagious time of node i, Ti, can be easily computed as in
Ti =
∞∑
t=0
P (Xi(t) = Con.) · t∑∞
t=0 P (Xi(t) = Con.)
(6.3.5)
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Figure 6.7: The intersection ratio between the sorted nodes of contagious ability and
various proactive measures.
Among the three observations, we mainly focus on observation 2 and 3 since
observation 1 is practically infeasible in real OSNs, as explained in Section 6.3.1.
Moreover, previous work of [112] has proven that the connection ratio and the link
remaining ratio almost reaches zero if we remove the top 30% of the most connected
nodes from the OSN topologies. Under this situation, the rumors deﬁnitely cannot
spread.
Justiﬁcation 1 (Observation 2): The contagious ability, Ai, denotes the potential
number of the following nodes infected by node i. Thus, a node with stronger conta-
gious ability is conceptually more worthwhile for blocking rumors in OSNs. We sort
the nodes according to the contagious abilities and choose the result as a benchmark.
With diﬀerent values of λ, we work out the intersection between the benchmark and
the sorted nodes of various proactive measures. The results are shown in Fig. 6.7.
We can see the betweenness and degree measures capture more nodes with higher
contagious abilities. This may be the reason why the betweenness measure performs
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Figure 6.8: The average contagious time of the degree and betweenness measures when
λ < 10%.
best and the second best belongs to the degree measure.
Justiﬁcation 2 (Observation 3): If a rumor spreads in the network, we then
calculate the contagious time of each node in order to justify the superior short-term
performance of the degree measure. We can use 1‖Ω‖
∑
i∈Ω Ti to estimate the average
contagious time among the nodes in Ω. Given a defense ratio λ, Ω is the set of nodes
chosen for blocking rumors. The results are shown in Fig. 6.8. We can see the
average contagious time of nodes chosen by the degree measure is much less than the
nodes chosen by the betweenness measure. This means the nodes with large degrees
will be infected earlier. Thus, if we use the nodes chosen by the degree measure to
block rumors, the spread in the short-term will be restrained faster compared with
the nodes chosen by the betweenness measure.
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Figure 6.9: The number of infected users by varying truth injecting time. Setting: E(ηRij) =
0.75.
6.4 Clarify Rumors Using Truths
In this section, we will analyze the remedial measure using the mathematical model.
There are mainly two factors, tinject and E(η
T
ij). They can greatly aﬀect the eﬃciency
of restraining rumors by spreading truths.
6.4.1 Impact of the Truth Injection Time
To exclusively investigate the impact of tinject, we typically set E(η
R
ij) = E(η
T
ij) = 0.75.
Based on the spread dynamics shown in Fig. 6.6, we assign tinject as
• 0: truth starts with rumor,
• 3: truth starts in the early stage of rumor spread,
• 5: truth starts in the late stage of rumor spread.
The experiments are executed on both the Facebook and Google Plus networks, with
both groups of people making absolute choices and M-S-M choices. The results are
shown in Fig. 6.9.
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Figure 6.10: The number of contagious and active nodes at any time t in the propagation.
Setting: E(ηRij) = 0.75.
Observation 4: The truth clariﬁcation method performs better if the spread of
truths starts earlier, but if not, this method has a weak performance in the early stage
since the rumors are distributed incredibly fast. We can see the propagation scale
will decrease dramatically after we inject truth into the network. Both the spread
of rumors and truths will ﬁnally become steady. The results in Fig. 6.9 indicates
the remedial measure of spreading truth mainly performs long-term eﬀectiveness in
restraining rumors.
We further investigate the number of contagious nodes (
∑m
i P (Xi(t) = Con.))
and active nodes (
∑m
i P (Xi(t) = Act.)) at any time t during the spread. The results
are shown in Fig. 6.10. We can see from Fig. 6.10(A1) and Fig. 6.10(C1) that
tinject has some eﬀect on restraining the number of contagious nodes when people
making absolute choices. However, in Fig. 6.10(B1) and Fig. 6.10(D1), we ﬁnd
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Figure 6.11: The number of infected nodes and recovered nodes with diﬀerent values E(ηTij).
Setting: tinject = 3, E(η
R
ij) = 0.6.
tinject has no obvious eﬀect when people make M-S-M choices. Moreover, we can
see from Fig.6.10(A2-D2) that the number of active nodes will take eﬀect according
to the value of tinject. The results of Fig. 6.10 have explained the impact of tinject
observed in Fig. 6.9 from the perspective of both contagious and active nodes in the
propagation dynamics.
6.4.2 Impact of the Truth Propagation Probability
To exclusively examine the impact of the truth propagation probability, E(ηTij), we
typically set tinject = 3 and E(η
R
ij) = 0.6. The values of E(η
T
ij) will be set as
• 0.3: people are not willing to believe the truth,
• 0.6: people fairly believe the truth,
• 0.9: people most likely believe the truth.
Both the Facebook and Google Plus networks will be used in the experiments. Sim-
ilarly, the cases of people making absolute choices or M-S-M choices will also be
considered. The results are shown in Fig. 6.11.
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Figure 6.12: The number of active nodes with diﬀerent values E(ηTij). Setting: tinject = 3,
E(ηRij) = 0.6.
Observation 5: The eﬃciency of restraining rumors using the remedial measure
largely decreases when people are not willing to spread truths. In accordance with the
reality, we ﬁnd E(ηTij) has extraordinary impact on restraining rumors by spreading
truths in OSNs. In addition, we examine the number of active nodes (
∑m
i P (Xi(t) =
Act.)) at any time t during the spread dynamics. As shown in Fig. 6.12, a smaller
value of E(ηTij) will lead to a smaller number of active nodes. This exactly corresponds
to the limited eﬃciency of the remedial measure shown in Fig. 6.11.
Given a critical rumor spreading in the network (E(ηRij) > 0.5), we can summarize
two real cases according to the values E(ηTij) as follows:
1) E(ηTij) > 0.5: In the real world, through propaganda or other measurements,
people may be willing to believe and spread truths. According to previous analysis,
the truth holder can receive an acceptable or even better result by spreading truths
to restrain rumors when E(ηTij) > 0.5.
2) E(ηTij) < 0.5: According to the results of Fig. 6.11, the remedial measure may
not be able to counter the spread of rumors in this case. Actually, this is a common
phenomenon that always happens in the real world. Readers can refer to Section 6.1
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Figure 6.13: The maximum number of infected users (Imax), the ﬁnal number of infected
users (Ifinal) and the ﬁnal number of recovered users (Rfinal). Settings: tinject = 3, E(η
R
ij) =
0.75, E(ηTij) ∈ [0.1, 0.9].
for an extended discussion.
6.5 Putting Eggs into Diﬀerent Baskets
In this section, we investigate the pros and cons when diﬀerent measures work to-
gether. We also explore the equivalence of these measures.
To numerically evaluate the eﬀectiveness of these measures, we use the maximal
number of infected users (Imax) and the ﬁnal number of infected users (Ifinal) to
present the damage caused by rumors. In the real world, when either Imax or Ifinal
becomes larger, more damage will be caused to society.
6.5.1 Measures Working Together
Firstly , we examine the values of Imax and Ifinal on the basis of the mathematical
model. We typically set tinject = 3 and E(η
T
ij) ranges from 0.1 to 0.9. The results
are shown in Fig. 6.13. We can see the values of Imax always remain large while
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the values of Ifinal gradually decrease with the increasing E(η
T
ij). This indicates the
remedial measure cannot alleviate the damage denoted by Imax. On the contrary, the
proactive measures are able to reduce Imax according to the analysis in Section 6.2.
Secondly , the spread of rumors and truths actually presents a common issue in
the ﬁeld of psychology when E(ηTij) < 0.5 < E(η
R
ij). That is a “rumor has wings
while truth always stays indoors” since people naturally have ‘negativity bias ’ on the
received information [60]. According to observation 5, the remedial measure cannot
largely reduce the value of Ifinal when E(η
T
ij) < 0.5 < E(η
R
ij). We notice in observation
4 that the remedial measure only has a long-term performance, while in observation
3 the degree measure has a short-term best performance.
To address the speciﬁc case of a “rumor has wings while truth always stays in-
doors”, we propose to put the eggs in diﬀerent baskets. Both the degree measure and
the truth clariﬁcation method will be used for restraining rumors in OSNs. As an
example, we set E(ηRij) = 0.9 and tinject = 3 to do a case study. Besides, E(η
T
ij) and
λ will be assigned as:
• λ = 10%, E(ηTij) = 0: proactive measures,
• λ = 0, E(ηTij) = 0.6: remedial measure,
• λ = 5%, E(ηTij) = 0.3: two methods together.
The results are shown in Fig. 6.14. We ﬁnd that if we set λ = 5%, E(ηTij) = 0.3, both
Imax and Ifinal will decrease compared with another two extreme settings which can
only reduce either Imax or Ifinal. That is to say, put the eggs into diﬀerent baskets.
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Figure 6.14: A case study of measures working together. Settings: tinject = 3, E(ηRij) =
0.75.
6.5.2 Equivalence of Measures
In the real world, surveillance on inﬂuential users needs a lot of ﬁnancial support.
The propaganda used to prompt the spread of truths also costs a lot of money. Given
a limited budget, we explore the equivalence between the proactive and remedial
measures in order to leverage the two diﬀerent strategies.
Firstly, we investigate Ifinal when we apply diﬀerent defense ratios (λ) and values
of E(ηTij) on the propagation of rumors and truths. On the basis of our mathematical
model, this part of the analysis will disclose the congruent relationship between the
values of λ and E(ηTij) in networks. Typically, we set tinject = 3, E(η
R
ij) = 0.75 and
use the Facebook and Google Plus topologies. The results are shown in Fig. 6.15.
Given a pair of λ and E(ηTij), we can ﬁnd several equivalent solutions with diﬀerent
values of λ and E(ηTij). These diﬀerent solutions have the same performance as the
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Figure 6.15: The ﬁnal number of infected nodes (Ifinal) when we set a series of diﬀerent
defense ratios (λ) and truth spreading probabilities E(ηtruthij ). Setting: tinject = 3, E(η
R
ij) =
0.75.
original pair of λ and E(ηTij). This means we can leverage the proactive and remedial
measures according to the ﬁxed budget.
Secondly, we further examine the numeric equivalence in the Facebook and
Google Plus networks. We will also consider people making absolute and M-S-M
choices. Following the settings of Fig. 6.15, we provide the results in Fig. 6.16. We
ﬁnd that numeric equivalence exists in most cases. On the basis of the results in
Fig. 6.16, we are able to identify the exact schemas to replace the original pair of λ
and E(ηTij). This part of the analysis and the results are of great signiﬁcance from a
practical point of view in the real world.
152
Figure 6.16: The numeric equivalence between the degree measure and the remedial mea-
sure when we set a series of diﬀerent defense ratios (λ) and truth spreading probabilities
E(ηTij). Setting: tinject = 3, E(η
R
ij) = 0.75.
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Figure 6.17: The average degree of nodes infected at each time tick.
6.6 Discussion
6.6.1 Robustness of the Contagious Ability
In this section, we ﬁrstly discuss the robustness of the contagious ability used in
Section 6.2. According to the deﬁnition of contagious ability, its usage relies on
rumor spreading origins. However, it can be directly used for numeric evaluation of
other measures when the spread of rumors originates from highly connected nodes.
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To conﬁrm the robustness of this usage, we examine the average degree of contagious
nodes, Dt, at each time tick t, as in
Dt =
m∑
i=0
P (Xi(t) = Con.)∑m
i=0 P (Xi(t) = Con.)
· di. (6.6.1)
wherein di is the degree of node i. In the experiments, we randomly choose the rumor
origins and average the values of Dt at each time tick t according to 100 runs. The
results are shown in Fig. 6.17. It is clear that Dt stays high at the beginning and
then sharply decreases till the end of the spread. This means the nodes with higher
degrees are more easily infected in the early stages. Actually, this feature may be
caused by the power-law and scale-free properties of OSNs [35]. As a result, the
contagious ability based on randomly chosen origins will not largely deviate from the
ones based on the identical highly-connected origins. This explains the robustness of
the usage of the contagious ability in Section 6.2.
6.6.2 Fairness to Community Bridges
We brieﬂy discuss the fairness to community bridges when we evaluate the eﬃciency of
restraining rumors. In the real world, people form various communities according to
their interests, occupations and social relationships. They are more likely to contact
people within the same communities. Thus, it would be more precise to consider this
premise in our analysis. However, the algorithms (CFinder [17] and NetMiner [67])
have not considered the communication bias between community members. This
may cause some unfairness to the community bridges when we evaluate the rumor
restraining eﬃciency.
In fact, the spread of information in a community environment is a more complex
process. We plan to corporate the communication bias in communities from the
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records of real OSNs. This may help us more accurately evaluate the eﬃciency of
diﬀerent measures. Due to word restrictions, we will leave this for our work in the
future.
6.7 Conclusion for This Chapter
In this chapter, we carry out a series of analyses on the methods of restraining rumors.
On the basis of our mathematical model, the analysis results suggest that the degree
and betweenness measure outperforms all other proactive measures. In addition, we
observe the degree measure has better short-term performance in the early stages.
We also investigate the eﬃciency of spreading truth in order to restrain rumors. We
ﬁnd the truth clariﬁcation method mainly has a long-term performance. In order to
address the critical case “rumor has wings while truth always stays indoors”, we fur-
ther explore the strategies of diﬀerent measures working together and the equivalence
leverage of both of them. From both an academic and practical perspective, our work
is of great signiﬁcance in this ﬁeld.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
The research presented in this thesis consists of two parts: the ﬁrst part focuses on
modeling the propagation of Internet malicious information. The second part mainly
focuses on locating the most inﬂuential users and identifying the optimal counter-
measure in the defense of Internet malicious information. This chapter summarizes
the research results and the main contributions of this thesis.
7.1 Contributions
Theoretical and experimental results have led to the conclusion and main contribution
of this thesis. These are:
• We have proposed a novel model to present the temporal dynamics of the in-
formation propagation. This is a discrete mathematical model and can present
the diﬀerent time users check newly arrived messages. The proposed model also
addresses the spatial dependence problem in propagation modeling. In previous
models, the spatial dependence problem has signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the accura-
cy of the modeling. By eliminating the eﬀect of propagation cycles in modeling,
our proposed model can accurately present the propagation dynamics compared
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with previous models.
• We also extend the proposed model in order to present the infection and self-
start processes in the modeling. If we take modern email malware for example,
our model employs virtual nodes to describe the replicated infection processes.
By introducing the Bernoulli approximation on modeling the reinfection pro-
cesses, the computation complexity of modeling the reinfection processes largely
decreases. Experiments show our model can accurately present the propagation
of modern email malware.
• We investigate the cases of people making choices on received conﬂicting infor-
mation, such as rumors and truths. The propagation of conﬂicting information
depends on the mechanism people use to make choices. On the basis of the in-
vestigation, we propose a novel model to present the propagation of conﬂicting
information by applying diﬀerent mechanisms into the modeling. Simulations
show our model is accurate and can be used to analyze the impacts of diﬀerent
parameters on the propagation.
• We further explore the method of identifying the most inﬂuential users in net-
works and the optimal defense mechanism against Internet malicious informa-
tion. Our proposed models have provided a standard platform to examine the
eﬃciency of current defense methods. According to the experiment results, we
found the degree and betweenness measures perform better when we block ma-
licious information at inﬂuential users in the network. Moreover, if we want to
eliminate malicious information in networks, we need to spread truths to clarify
rumors.
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7.2 Future Works
Although the proposed models and analyses have solved some critical problems, there
remains several problems that need to be addressed in this ﬁeld. We summarize these
as follows:
• Modeling the propagation of conﬂicting and supportive information: Given an
object in the real world, there is usually conﬂicting and supportive information
about it. When people receive supportive information, they may make a positive
decision, such as purchasing the object if it is a product. When people receive
conﬂicting information, they may make a negative decision, such as rejecting to
accept the object. As multiple pieces of conﬂicting and supportive information
spread in Internet, their propagation processes may be too complex to model.
To date, we have not found any method to present the propagation dynamics
of information in this instance.
• The optimal method of restraining the propagation of malicious information:
In this thesis, which method is the best among current solutions and when
this method will outperform others has been answered. However, we have not
answered the question of what kind of method is the optimal solution for re-
straining the propagation of malicious information. Our work in Chapter 6 is
still at the very beginning stages.
• Locating the spreaders of malicious information: Another signiﬁcant part of my
research is to locate the spreaders of malicious information. Their creations are
illegal, and they should deﬁnitely be punished. However, most of them have yet
to caught. By reversing the propagation modeling, our work can provide useful
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information on locating the origins of the spreading, which may suggest who
are the spreaders of malicious information. However, because of the complexity
of the Internet, current methods may not be applicable in the real world.
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